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Abstract
Public sector corruption is endemic in many economies and is frequently cited as a
cause of poor economic performance. Corruption hinders the completion of beneficial trans-
actions and distorts the outcomes of economic policies. It can also affect the policy choices
of governments as they attempt to counteract the consequences of corruption. Excessive
inflation may be a negative side effect of corruption if the government compensates for lost
revenue by increasing the rate of monetary expansion to exploit seigniorage.
There is convincing empirical evidence from cross-section studies that inflation
and corruption are positively correlated. It has been suggested that this is a consequence of
governments in corrupt economies turning to the use of seigniorage as a method of raising
revenue (Al-Marhubi, 2000). This seems a likely route through which the correlation can
arise, but the mechanism at work has not received any theoretical attention. In particular,
there has been no demonstration that an optimizing government will rationally exploit
seigniorage as a response to corruption. The contribution of this study is an analysis of
this issue in theoretical models in which the growth rate of money supply is chosen by
an optimizing government. Although an empirical analysis is undertaken to explore the
relationship between corruption and inflation in chapter one, the main focus of the study
is on chapters three, four, and five where theoretical analysis plays the principal role in the
research.





There is a general agreement among macroeconomists that inflation is a monetary
phenomenon in the long-run. There are some effects such as growth in public expenditure,
tax cuts, and an increase in individual consumption that pull up market demand and the
price level as well. On the other side, some other factors shifting the market supply curve
upwards could also lead to a growth in the consumer price level such as an increase in wages
or a growth in raw materials and oil prices. However, theses demand-pull effects as well as
cost-push causes of inflation are negligible, and they will not persist in the long-run. Since
the rise of monetarism in the 1970s, there has been a general agreement in macroeconomics
that inflation is a monetary phenomenon in the long-run and is caused by the growth in
the money supply in excess of the growth rate of trend output.
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Friedman (1968, 1970) were the first generation
of monetarists who highlighted the demand-pull inflation where fluctuations are due to an
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increase in aggregate demand resulting from a growth in the money supply. They believed
that adaptive expectations caused the level of price to be adjusted gradually, so the effect
of money supply growth remains in prices even in the long-run, but the output level will
be affected only in the short-run. The next generation of monetarists, including Lucas
(1972), Sargent and Wallace (1975) and Barro (1978), agreed on the same consequence for
the effect of money growth on inflation in the long-run, and they added the concepts of
rational expectations and misperception of suppliers to the literature. However, although
post-Keynesian macroeconomists such as Davidson and Weintraub (1973) believe that a
growth in money supply and in the inflation rate result from an increase in the level of
wages, New-Keynesian macroeconomists do agree on the inflationary effect of the excessive
money supply in the market.
1.2 Theories of Inflation
If there is such an agreement that inflation is a monetary phenomenon, what could
be the explanation behind the story of inflation and persistent growth in the money sup-
ply? Although inflation has been under control in developed economies in recent years, it
has been the main concern for developing nations with high inflation rates. Some theo-
ries including time inconsistency of optimal planning by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and
political business cycle theories by Nordhaus (1975) and Hibbs (1977) explore the causes
of the high inflation rates and monetary expansions, but they are applicable to developed
economies with well-established democracies, and they cannot appropriately explain the
high growth rate in money supply and high inflation rate in many developing countries.
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The main objective of this research is to explore whether corruption can be an
explanation for continuous monetary expansion and the persistently high inflation rate.
There must be a political economy explanation for the effect of corruption on the inflation
rate in developing nations as well as developed economies. It is interesting to see the evidence
on developed economies where the inflation rate is even higher than the social optimal
rate targeted by monetary offi cials. There have been studies exploring this phenomenon.
Nordhaus (1975) states that voters are sensitive to the inflation rate and the unemployment
rate, and the economic aspects of life are influenced by the government’s position in the
trade-offbetween these two variables. He shows that opportunistic political parties in power
aim to influence the short-sighted voters to win the re-election and stay in power. The
Nordhaus Opportunistic Model shows that democratic systems tend to choose a policy that
achieves an inflation rate which is higher that the optimal rate in the long-run. Kydland
and Prescott (1977) introduced the time inconsistency of optimal planning to explain the
high rate of monetary expansion and, therefore, the high inflation rate. They model a
dynamic game between informed monetary offi cials and provident private sector agents
who know the incentives of policy makers and do not trust them unless there are some
restricted commitments. Kydland and Prescott (1977) discuss how monetary authorities
choose discretionary policies to reduce the unemployment rate by creating surprise positive
inflation which is higher than the optimal rate.
Seigniorage is the third reason that is offered to explain the high inflation rate.
Tanzi (1978) argued that because the financial markets are ineffi cient in developing countries
with fiscal deficits, the public sector turns to an inflation tax to finance for budget deficits.
4
Phelps (1973), using the theory of optimal taxation, describes how the government chooses
to exploit seigniorage to equate the marginal cost of the inflation tax with the marginal
cost of the output tax. Cukierman et al. (1992) show that countries with unstable and
polarized political systems suffer from ineffi cient tax structures, and that they rely more on
seigniorage.
The contribution of this study is to explore an additional explanation for money
supply growth and inflation. The hypothesis is examined that corruption in the public
sector can explain the growth rate of money supply. In fact, the effect of corruption on
macroeconomic indicators has been analyzed recently, and corruption is cited as a significant
cause of poor economic performance. The analysis of the destructive effect of corruption on
economic growth commenced in the 1990s using both empirical and theoretical techniques.
The effect of corruption on growth and investment has been well-analyzed by Baumol (1990),
Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Mauro (1995), and Guetat (2006). The basis argument is that
technological development is the main engine of the economic growth and is generated by
talented forces active in the economy. These productive agents could decide to be a rent-
seeker instead of a producer if the reward structure is poorly organized and biased towards
corruption. Therefore, when there is corruption the economic sources will be allocated to
unproductive activities, and there could be less innovation and lower growth in the economy.
Although all the explanations provided for the negative effect of corruption on growth could
also explain its effect on inflation, there are some studies investigating this link in a political
economic framework.
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1.3 Public Sector Corruption
The literature that analyzes the effect of corruption on the public sector can be
divided into two categories including monetary and fiscal outcomes of corruption. The
literature review below briefly summarizes both parts of this literature. However, there has
been very little work that focuses explicitly on corruption and inflation.
Aisen and Veiga (2006) consider political instability and economic freedom as
explanations for the high inflation rate. They claim to use robust variables of political
instability including the number of government crises in a year where the current regime
was threatened with downfall. The number of cabinet changes and the level of economic
freedom are other proxies for political instability used in this study. Using a dataset on 178
counties from 1960 to 1999 and a dynamic panel data approach, it is shown that higher
political instability is significantly associated with a higher inflation rate, and this link
is stronger in countries with higher inflation. Aisen and Veiga mentioned that, although
inflation is an output from monetized budget deficit, they decided to ignore this in their
model.
Cukierman et al (1992) suggest another political economic explanation for the
persistent cross-country differences in seigniorage. They blame ineffi cient tax systems in
those countries that failed to administer a skillful and sophisticated tax system. A high
tax-collection cost is one of the main problems for the public sector in such countries to col-
lect and monitor taxes. This makes it easier for tax evasion to occur. Hence, a government
with an ineffi cient tax system relies heavily on seigniorage and inflation to provide finance
for public expenditure. They provide various estimates in their empirical work to prove this
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hypothesis. Their cross-sectional analysis over 79 countries shows that political instability
and polarization are positively correlated with seigniorage in the dataset of all countries.
However, their results show that countries with unstable and polarized economies rely rel-
atively more on seigniorage. They also show that central bank independence decreases
inflation volatility.
In addition, Aisen and Veiga (2008) indicate that less central bank independence is
associated with a lower rate of inflation volatility. The focus of their study is to investigate
the explanatory variables for seigniorage in a panel data analysis on a dataset covering 169
countries from 1960 to 1999. They show that total government revenue from seigniorage for
developing countries is five times the level of revenue in industrialized countries during 1960-
1999. This motivated them to explore for the explanation of higher seigniorage in developing
countries. They believe that the variables explaining inflation could not necessarily explain
seigniorage. Their analysis shows that there is a negative correlation between seigniorage
and inflation for countries with hyperinflation above 400 percent although it is positive for
all other countries with less than 400 percent in inflation. They emphasized that the study
of explanatory variables for seigniorage must be different from their study of inflation in
2006. Their findings show that political instability and social polarization is associated with
higher seigniorage which confirms the results of Cukierman et al. (1992), Click (1998), and
Woo (2002, 2003). Aisen and Veiga (2008) added a new result indicating that the positive
correlation between seigniorage and political instability and social polarization is stronger
in some circumstances, such as in countries with higher inflation, less democracy, and lower
economic freedom.
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Huang andWei (2006) introduced a theoretical model of a monetary policy game to
see how the quality of public institutions affects the desirability of several popular monetary
regimes such as inflation targeting or a conservative central banker. They found that the
quality of public institutions determines the optimal level of conservatism in central bankers.
Hence, central banks are less conservative in developing countries with poorly qualified
public sectors. Their model shows that in an extreme case, when poor institutes make it
impossible for the government to collect tax revenues, the degree of conservatism of central
banks is zero. Their assumption is to consider weak quality of institutions as an ablation
in the government capability to raise taxes through offi cial channels. They assume that
this might be a result of “outright theft”by tax offi cials as well as collusion between tax
inspectors and taxpayers in the form of bribe to reduce the tax obligation. This is the point
that Huang and Wei (2006) mentioned as the reason behind their assumption discussed
above. However, they did not explicitly model this type of corruption and tax evasion
in their study. Furthermore, their results include another interesting point in which the
optimal targeted inflation rate is higher for the economies with weaker public institutions
than economies with highly qualified public institutions (1% - 4%).
1.4 Empirical Research
The empirical work undertaken by Woo (2003) was an investigation of the main
determinants of budget deficits. He examined a set of 40 explanatory variables classified as
economic variables, sociopolitical determinants, and institutional variables. The proxy used
to illustrate the quality of government institutions was International Country Risk Guide
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(ICRG) data in this study. ICRG is measured by the Political Risk Services (PRS) group
based on the components of the rule of law, bureaucratic quality, corruption, expropriation
risk, and government repudiation of contracts. Their panel analysis on a sample covering
57 developed and developing countries from 1970 to1990 showed that low-quality institu-
tions are significantly associated with a lower budget surplus. Although Woo (2003) did
not embed corruption directly in his model, he provided an explanation that the level of
corruption can be a good measure of the quality of budgetary institutions.
The empirical studies seeking to explicitly determine the effect of corruption on
inflation started with an analysis undertaken by Al-Marhubi (2000). His investigation on
a cross-country dataset considers 41 countries over the period 1980—1995. Alternative indi-
cators for corruption have been tested in econometrics analysis with two of them obtained
from Transparency International. Others are the measure of corruption by Business Interna-
tional (BI) and the bureaucratic effi ciency index by Mauro’s (1995). All four of the indices
are positively associated with the inflation rate and statistically significant. Al-Marhubi
provided four clear explanations about how this positive link between corruption and in-
flation might arise. First, it could be optimum for the government to generate seigniorage
(according to the theory of optimal taxation). Second, he considered tax collection costs
likely to be higher in countries with higher level of corruption, and this make it optimal
for the public sector to turn to seigniorage as an alternative source of revenue. He also
added that corruption could lead to a reduction in taxable assets by making capital flight
easier, and a reduction in public revenues and increasing costs could simultaneously lead
to a deficit with inflationary outcomes for economies with less-developed financial markets.
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All the suggested ways in which corruption could affect inflation have this capacity to be
examined individually. Although he did not continue to test explicitly each of these assump-
tions, he believed that all the effects of corruption on inflation are through the channel of
seigniorage.
The significant positive correlation between corruption and inflation appears to
be robust in a range of data sets. Empirical studies by Abed and Davoodi (2000), Smith-
Hilman (2007) and Samimi et al. (2012) also confirmed that the link between corruption
and inflation is significant and positive. While these empirical investigations show that
corruption could be an explanation for inflation, conversely there is some evidence showing
that inflation motivates corruption as well. Studies by Braun and Di Tella (2000), Ger-
ring and Thacker (2005), and Akca et al. (2012) explain that inflation increases auditing
and monitoring costs, and this makes some level of corruption to be condoned and more
demanded. Of course, the demand for corruption could be influenced by other economic
characteristics and social norms. However, if inflation is a motive for corruption this leads
to an implication that corruption could lead to further corruption due to inflation.
1.5 Organization
In this study the main objective is to explore the effect of the existence of corrup-
tion in the public sector on inflation in a theoretical framework. The thesis is divided into
six chapters. Chapter two is an empirical analysis to confirm the results discussed above
that show a positive link between corruption and inflation. This chapter is considered as
a motivation to undertake the research, and the main body of the thesis includes chapter
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three, four and five.
In chapter three, corruption is considered to be exogenous and embedded in an
overlapping generations model where a social welfare maximizing government chooses the
optimal rate of money supply to compensate for the revenue lost to corruption in the
economy. The novelty of chapter four is to make the level of corruption endogenous in
which individuals in the model have an option to choose between being honest and corrupt
if they choose to work in the public sector. Corruption leads to a loss of self-esteem, so
the set of corrupt public employees is determined by the individual-specific value placed on
self-esteem. The analysis determines the equilibrium in employment allocation across the
private and public sectors, and the division between honest and corrupt. This endogenizes
the level of corruption in a static time scale. Bribes are paid by a representative firm as a
reward for being charged a reduced rate of tax, with the division of gains determined by
Nash bargaining. This endogenized corruption will be embedded in a dynamic monetary
model in Chapter five to explore the impacts of endogenized corruption on inflation. The
findings of the research show that both exogenous and endogenous corruption increase the





The empirical link between corruption and inflation has been clear for some time.
A significant positive correlation between the two is apparent in a range of data sets and
seems robust to the choice of conditioning variables (see Akça et al., 2012, for numerous
references). There have been several studies that looked at the detrimental effects of cor-
ruption on economic growth and investment (Barro (1999), Mauro (1995) and Cole and
Chawdhry (2002)). However, Al-Marhubi (2000) was the first to show empirically that
there was a positive correlation between the level of corruption and the inflation rate. His
cross-sectional analysis of 41 countries over 1980-95 showed that four alternative indices of
corruption were positively and significantly correlated with inflation.
Further research has followed Al-Marhubi. The results of Abed and Davoodi (2000)
also showed that a higher corruption level is significantly associated with a higher inflation
rate in both a cross-section data set for 24 countries and in a panel data analysis including
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82 countries. Although Smith-Hillman (2007) found that the coeffi cient of corruption as a
regressor for the inflation rate is not statistically significant for African and industrialized
countries separately, the estimated coeffi cient for the full sample of all countries is significant
and positive. Samimi et al. (2012) also concluded that the link is significant and positive,
and that higher corruption is correlated with a higher inflation tax.
The causality in the relationship between inflation and corruption could run in
either direction. Al-Marhubi (2000) proposed the explanation that corruption in the public
sector encourages the government to exploit seigniorage to raise revenue. Conversely, Akça
et al. (2012) and Broun and Di Tella (2004) suggested that the existence of inflation could
be the motive for corruption. Later chapters of the dissertation provide theoretical models
of the transmission mechanism.
The contribution of this chapter is to illustrate the empirical correlation between
inflation and corruption by conducting a panel data analysis of a dataset including 164
countries. The following section briefly introduces the two main sources of data available
for corruption indices and the description of the corruption data provided by these sources.
2.2 Corruption Data
2.2.1 Corruption Perception Index (CPI)
The CPI compiled by Transparency International is one of the most popular data
sources on corruption. It ranks countries based on how corrupt their public sector is per-
ceived to be. Corruption is defined by Transparency International as the abuse of entrusted
power for private gain. The CPI measures the perception of corruption in the public sector
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Figure 2.1: Classification of 177 countries based on CPI in 2013
that involves either public offi cials, civil servants, or politicians.
To construct the CPI, Transparency International uses information from 13 data
sources that are recognized as expert in governance and business climate analysis (Appendix
A). Each country is given a score between 0-100. Zero indicates a country perceived to be
highly corrupt and 100 means the country is observed to be very clear from corruption.
Figure 1.1 represents a cross-section data sample of the very recently published CPI for
177 Countries. It shows that 70% of the countries scored under 50 while only 6% of the
sample is placed in the range of 80-100. Such a significant proportion of countries perceived
to be corrupt emphasizes the importance of exploring this phenomenon especially since the
set of corrupt countries includes both developing and developed countries. However, the
6% of countries with the least corruption were all developed countries and OECD members
(Appendix C).
14
Figure 2.2: Classification of 177 countries based on FFC in 2013
2.2.2 Freedom From Corruption (FFC)
The FFC is one of the 10 components used to construct the index of Economic
Freedom produced by the Heritage Foundation. The Economic Freedom index provides a
picture of the level of freedom in the economic environment of a country. The Foundation
focuses on four important aspects of the rule of law, government size, regulatory effi ciency,
and market openness to measure the 10 components where FFC is placed the aspect of
the rule of law. Corruption is considered as reducing economic freedom by generating
insecurity, creating uncertainty in economic relations, increasing the cost of activities, and
shifting economic resources into unproductive activities.
The FFC is basically derived from Transparency International’s CPI. However,
more countries are covered by FFC. The Heritage Foundation uses other reliable data sources
to compile a corruption index for the countries that are not covered in the CPI country
sample. Therefore, in this chapter the FFC has been used in the analysis because the data
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Figure 2.3: Inflation and corruption
validation is more comprehensive than the CPI. Each country is graded on a scale of 0 to
100 where 0 represents highly corrupt and 100 is very free from corruption. Figure 1.2 also
shows that a large proportion of the countries (74%) are placed in a range of 0-49.9 in the
year 2013.
2.3 Scatter Plots
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 depict scatter graphs of inflation against the two measures of
corruption. The data points represent country averages over the period 1995 to 2010 for
a sample of 87 countries that have complete data over the sample period. Appendix B
provides a list of the countries included.
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Figure 2.4: Inflation and bureaucracy
Averaged inflation is the annual percentage increase in consumer prices obtained
from World Development Indicators (2012). The measure of corruption is based on the
Heritage Foundation "Freedom From Corruption" (FFC) index which is between 0-100. A
higher value of this index shows higher freedom from corruption in a country, so the value of
(100-FFC) is plotted in the figure. The positive correlation between corruption and inflation
can be clearly seen.
An alternative to the FFC index is the index of Bureaucracy Quality (BQ) from
Political Risk Services (PRS) group. Each country receives a score from 0 to 4 where high-
risk countries with weak bureaucratic infrastructure receive low scores. We call the value
of (4- BQ) the "Poorness of bureaucracy" and plot this against inflation in figure 2.4. The
figure shows that poor bureaucratic quality is positively correlated with high inflation.
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These figures illustrate why previous empirical investigations have discovered a
positive and significant correlation between inflation and corruption even if the direction of
causality cannot be determined.
2.4 Panel Data Approach
This section analyzes the relationship between corruption and inflation in a regres-
sion model. As noted, the data on corruption has been generated since 1995. Therefore, a
panel dataset has been used in this study to enhance the degrees of freedom.
The analysis is based on the following regression equation:
INFit = α+ βGPGDPit + γGM2it + δOPENNESSit + θFFCit + εit, (2.1)
where INF is inflation in consumer prices (annual %), GPGDP is per capita GDP growth
(annual %), GM2 is growth in money and quasi money (annual %), and OPENNESS
is economic trade freedom. The subscripts i and t indicate country and time respectively.
Finally, FFC stands for freedom from corruption as measured by the Heritage Founda-
tion. This variable is derived primarily from the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of
Transparency International (TI). The other variables have been obtained from World De-
velopment Indicators (2012). Data from 164 countries is used (i = 1, 2, .., 164) over 16 years
(t = 1995, 1996, .., 2010). The data has been embedded in a panel dataset, and the analysis
is undertaken by using Eviews software.
The process of checking for panel data unit roots is a recent topic introduced
and proposed by Levin and Lin (1992) for the first time, and since developed by other
econometricians. It offers slightly different types of null hypothesis in defining unit roots.
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Panel unit root tests simply consider the asymptotic behavior of the time series (t) and
cross-sections (i), and this leads to obtaining a higher power test compared to the unit root
test in time series analysis. Table 2.1 shows the results of group unit root tests offered by
the Eviews programme. The null hypothesis in each case is the existence of a unit root.
The whole test outputs are listed and show that the variables are all stationary.
Test INF GPGDP GM2 OPENNESS FFC
Levin, Lin and Chu 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Im, Pesaran and Shin 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PP - Fisher Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 2.1. Probabilities of unit root tests (null is unit root)
When the variables are stationary in the panel data sample the next step is to
choose the analysis method. Fixed effect analysis assumes that intercepts are different
across countries. To estimate the fixed effect model the Fisher test is used to examine









/ (nt− n− 1)
˜F (n− 1, nt− n− 1),
where the restricted model is the model with identical intercepts for all countries (estimated
by the fixed effect method), and in the unrestricted model (estimated by the Ordinary
Least Squares method) each country has its own intercept. The variable n is the number
of regressors, which is 4 in this study.
The result for the F test in Table 2.2 shows that the null hypothesis of identical
intercepts for the countries is rejected, so the OLS method (pooled OLS) is not the right
method for estimating equation (2.1). In addition, the random effects model that explores
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differences in error variances can be used to estimate (2.1) when there is no correlation
between the error term and the regressors. The Hausman (1978) test has been used to
test the null hypothesis assuming the error term to be uncorellated with the regressors.
The results in Table 2.2 shows that the null hypothesis could not be rejected so there is
no significant correlation between the regressors and the error term. This implies that a
random effects model is more powerful and parsimonious than a fixed effects model.
Hierarchical tests P value
F Test 3.3920 0.000
Hausman Test 6.0676 0.1941
Table 2.2. Fixed effects or random effects
Table 2.3 presents the results of estimating equation (2.1) using random effects.
The coeffi cient on Freedom From Corruption is negative and significant, so corruption has
a significant positive correlation with inflation. Other things equal, countries with more
corruption experience a higher inflation rate. The results also support the prediction that
countries with a greater growth rate will have lower inflation. The coeffi cient of openness
is significant at a 10% significance level, and its positive sign in the inflation equation can
be explained by currency devaluation in more open countries.
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Dependent variable: Consumer price inflation, 1995-2010
Method: Random Effects









































R-squared 0.31 0.44 0.85 0.97 0.37
Included cross-sections 164 32 132 51 113
Included observations 1979 387 1592 664 1315
Table 2.3. Estimation results ((∗∗) is 5% significance level, (∗) is 10% significance level)
To explore the impact of corruption on inflation in countries with different level
of development, a simple separation has been made among the countries in the sample. 32
OECD countries are considered as developed nations (see appendix C1) while the remaining
countries are treated as developing economies (132 countries). Estimation results of the
equation (2.1) for both data samples are presented in Table 2.3 in the columns OECD and
non OECD. The estimated coeffi cients of FFC still show a positive correlation between
corruption and inflation in both developed and developing countries that is significant at
5% level. Moreover, in developing countries the estimated impact of the level of corruption
on the inflation rate is higher (in absolute value) than in developed countries (0.166 and
0.19). This implies that inflation is more sensitive to a change in corruption in developing
countries.
The final partition in the data sample is between oil-exporting and non-oil export-
ing countries (See appendix C2 for the list of countries). The classification is derived from
the U.S. Energy Information Administration that ranks world oil exporters (bbl/day). The
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idea is that there are more temptations towards corruption in the oil-exporting countries
with high oil revenues increasing the potential gains from corruption. OPEC countries
would be a proper sample to analyze this idea, but because of limitations in the availability
of the data for OPEC countries, this was not possible.
The results suggest that the coeffi cient of FFC is sensibly lower in oil-exporting
countries (0.03 versus 0.37) and it is not statistically significant although its sign is negative
in both samples. The reason for this unexpected result is because there are countries with
higher bureaucratic quality (i.e. Germany and Norway and Italy) among the oil-exporting
countries, so the effect of corruption on inflation cannot go higher.
2.5 Conclusion
The data shows a large number of economies placed in the category of highly cor-
rupt countries. This highlights the importance of exploring the impact of corruption on
economic outcomes. This empirical analysis has explored the link between corruption and
the inflation rate. To begin with, the scatter graphs illustrated that there is a positive rela-
tionship between corruption and inflation when the average data of inflation and corruption
is used for 87 countries over 15 years (1995-2010). This has provided the main motivation
of the empirical part of the study.
The results of a panel data analysis confirm the conclusion of the previous literature
about a positive and significant correlation between inflation and corruption. A sample of
164 countries from 1995 to 2010 has been used to estimate the correlation between corruption
and inflation. With all other things given, an increase of one unit in corruption leads to a
22
0.55 increase in inflation in consumer prices (annual %) which is statistically significant. As
already noted, the main purpose of this chapter was to confirm previous empirical findings
using new data sets and new econometric techniques. Al-Marhubi found that the magnitude
of the estimated coeffi cients of corruption were 0.17, 0.21, 0.22 and 0.26 .
The first two indicators were obtained from Transparency International and are
based on a perception of corruption that is mostly captured from people in multinational
firms and institutions. The third index used by Al-Marhubi was from the Business Interna-
tional (BI) that is based on perceptions drawn from BI overseas correspondents. The last
indicator was bureaucratic effi ciency index from Mauro (1995).
To compare the impact of corruption in developed and developing countries, a
separation has been made in data sample between OECD countries and non OECD where
the estimated coeffi cient of corruption in non OECD countries is slightly higher than OECD
nations. However, the model did not show a significant heterogeneity between oil-exporting
and non-oil exporting countries, but still the results indicate the positive link between
corruption and inflation in both economies.
These results show the link between corruption and inflation and provide the






Corruption has been shown to be positively correlated with inflation by numerous
empirical analyses. To demonstrate how a theoretical causality running from corruption to
inflation can arise is the main purpose of this research. Corruption is needed to be modelled
in a theoretical framework. It has been claimed that a government facing a corrupt economy
will exploit monetary expansion to compensate for the revenue lost, so the contribution of
this chapter is to embed corruption within a monetary model and to explore the effect of
increased corruption.
It is assumed that a government has two sources of revenue. It can levy taxes
on observable transactions or it can exploit the monopoly it holds over the creation of
fiat money to obtain revenue from seigniorage. If corruption reduces the revenue that the
government can derive from taxation then a motive is created for the government to turn to
seigniorage as an alternative source of revenue. When seigniorage is exploited, the implied
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monetary expansion will increase the rate of inflation. The missing link in this chain of
reasoning to connect corruption with inflation is a demonstration that the government has
a motive to exploit seigniorage in this way. I model a government that chooses seigniorage
to maximize a legitimate objective function and demonstrate that corruption can increase
the chosen level of seigniorage. This confirms that the positive correlation can emerge in a
world in which all economic agents pursue the standard objective of individual optimization.
The only previous theoretical analysis of the correlation between corruption and
inflation is Bohn (2010). That paper analyses a monetary policy game in the spirit of Rogoff
(1985) but with corruption affecting the payoff function of the government. It is therefore
a static analysis that does not model the role of money in the economy nor the dynamic
mechanism lying behind an intertemporal inflationary process. There has been rather more
analysis of the link between corruption and growth. Blackburn et al. (2010) and Blackburn
and Forues-Puccio (2010) show the damaging effect of corruption on the process of economic
development. However, in common with much of the growth literature, the models analyzed
are non-monetary so cannot be used to explore the effect of corruption on inflation.
To undertake my analysis I need to construct a model of the economy that is
explicitly monetary. This requires there to be a role for money in order to explain its use
and value, and some motive behind the government’s choice of money supply. The range of
monetary models in the literature includes money in the utility function, cash in advance,
or money as a store of value. I choose to focus on the latter, and analyze a model in
which money is the only store of value that allows purchasing power to be carried between
periods. I consider an overlapping generations economy with money and consumption loans.
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Individuals can use money to transfer purchasing power between different periods of life.
When, on average, individuals wish to hold money then money will have value. Seigniorage
will increase money supply and reduce the value of money or, conversely, raise the money-
price of the consumption good. By making the government choice of money growth rate
the outcome of an optimizing decision I am then able to explore how the resulting level of
inflation is linked to corruption.
A key element of the model is the selection of an appropriate measure of the
return to the government from seigniorage. A number of definitions have been proposed in
the literature. review these in section "Measures of Seigniorage" and briefly explore their
properties in order to explain the logic behind my choice of measure. Ultimately, I model
government revenue as the sum of tax receipts and seigniorage. The government chooses
the growth rate of money supply and the tax rate to maximize revenue. I can then analyze
how the optimal choices depend on the level and composition of corruption. The second
key element in the model is the representation of corruption. The work of Hindriks et al.
(1999) studies the details of the interaction between a taxpayer and a tax inspector. In
contrast, we adopt a more reduced form version of this interaction to allow us to embed
corruption within a dynamic equilibrium model. Three forms of corruption are considered.
The first two, the reduction of effective tax burden and the appropriation of tax revenue,
are related to Hindriks et al. (1999). The third, the appropriation of newly produced fiat
money, is a channel not previously analyzed in the corruption literature.
The analysis of the model demonstrates that the use of seigniorage to raise revenue
can be a rational strategy for a government when confronted with corruption that reduces
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revenue. An increase in any of the three forms of corruption can raise the rate of monetary
expansion as the government exploits seigniorage as a source of revenue. It is also shown that
this is not always the case and that there are some combinations of the corruption variables
for which an increase in the appropriation of revenue can reduce monetary expansion. In
summary, the results make a convincing case that corruption can be positively correlated
to inflation.
3.2 Measures of Seigniorage
The intention of the theoretical analysis is to explore the argument that corruption
leads to inflation because it creates an incentive for the government to exploit seigniorage as
a source of revenue. To proceed with the analysis it is necessary to have a suitable definition
of the benefits to the government of seigniorage. This section explores the alternative
definitions of seigniorage that have been provided in the literature.
Seigniorage is generally interpreted as the increase in resources that the government
obtains by issuing new fiat money. The alternative measures of this benefit are summarized
in table 3.1. For this table we defineM (t) as the nominal money base in year t, and ∆M (t)
as the increase in base over the previous year: ∆M (t) = M (t) −M (t− 1). P (t) is the
(aggregate) price level, Y (t) is real GDP, L (t) is the population, π (t) is the inflation rate,
and µ̃ (t) is the (net) rate of money expansion.
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Measure Source
V 1= ∆M (t) /P (t)Y (t) Buiter (2007)
V 2= i (t)M (t− 1) /P (t)Y (t) Buiter (2007), Flandreu (2006), Bordo (2006)
V 3= π (t)M (t− 1) /P (t)Y (t) Buiter (2007), Edwards and Tabelini (1991),
Bailey (1995), Freidman (1953)
V 4= µ̃ (t)M (t) /P (t)L (t) Drazan (1985), Fridman (1971)
V 5= ∆M (t) /P (t) Walsh (2010), McCandless and Wallace (1991)
Table 3.1. Definitions of seigniorage
V 1 is the real per capita change in the stock of nominal base money at the end
of period t. V 2 is considered as central bank revenue when i (t) is the risk-free nominal
interest rate on financial instrument. A distinct but relevant implication of seigniorage is
represented in V 3 which is Inflation Tax Revenue. It is a reduction in the real value of the
stock of base money caused by inflation (Buiter 2007). V 4 is the rate of money growth
multiplied by real value of the cash balance. It is assumed that the revenue rises in this way
is because of individual’s desire to keep real balance of money when there is an inflation.
In V 5 the government sells new printed money to the individuals so that the consumption
sources would be transferred from individuals to the public sector.
To support the choice of measure I note that several of these different measures are
closely related. First, observe that, given Y (t) , V 1 is simply proportional to V 5. Second,
since the (net) rate of money supply growth is defined by
µ̃ =






it follows that V 4 is also proportional to V 5 given L (t) .
In an economy where the real interest rate is determined by the change in prices
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(as it is in the models in the following sections) we have
r (t+ 1) =
P (t)− P (t+ 1)
P (t+ 1)
, (3.2)
and, similarly, the inflation rate is
π (t+ 1) =
P (t+ 1)− P (t)
P (t)
. (3.3)
Since the nominal interest rate, i, is defined by
1 + i (t+ 1) = [1 + r (t+ 1)] [1 + π (t+ 1)] , (3.4)
it follows from (3.2) —(3.4) that i (t+ 1) = 0. This shows that in the models we use V 2 will
be identically zero. Hence, it is not a successful measure of seigniorage in this context.
These observation shows that the selection of a measure of seigniorage leaves an
effective choice between V 3 and V 5. I choose to use V 5 because in the model we consider this
is equal to the quantity of commodity transferred from the private sector to the government
in exchange for the new addition to the money stock. It is therefore consistent with the
idea of seigniorage as the resources obtained by the government from the issue of money.
3.3 Monetary Equilibrium
This section describes a basic version of the model I employ and details the
derivation of the monetary equilibrium. The model is a variant of the Samuelson (1958)
consumption-loan model with fiat money issued by a government. A single form of corrup-
tion is considered which is manifested in the direct appropriation of newly issued money
by corrupt offi cials. The model is extended in section 3.5 by using a more general utility
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function, adding variable labour supply, and introducing corruption related to the effective
tax rate and government revenue.
The model adopts the standard assumption on population structure of the overlap-
ping generations economy. A new generation of individuals is born every period t and each
individual lives through that period and through period t+ 1. Since there are two genera-
tions alive in each period there can be trade between young and old, and consumption loans
between members of the same generation with different endowments. Individuals are born
either corrupt or non-corrupt, so the decision to become corrupt is not a choice. One inter-
pretation that can be placed on this assumption is that the corrupt are born into a family
which is in a position of suffi cient authority to beneficially exploit opportunities for corrup-
tion. In addition, there is some evidence that genetics variation may affect criminal and
impulsive behavior (Sherman et al. 1997). However, there is no discussion yet for the case
that corruption would be a cause of the genetics behavior. Perhaps corrupt behavior could
be inheritable, so the individuals could be corrupt by their birth. The number of corrupt
young individuals born at time t is denoted N1(t) and the number of non-corrupt individuals
is denoted N2(t). The total population of young at time t is therefore N(t) = N1(t)+N2(t).
There is only one good available and there is no storage technology to permit
transfers of this good from one period to the next. In each period the total endowment
of consumption good must either be consumed or wasted. Every individual receives an
endowment (which can be zero) in each period and, potentially, receives money from the
government. Young individuals may also buy additional money from the old or from the
government to allow the transfer of purchasing power across periods. Consumption loans
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between members of the same generation are granted in the first period of life and repaid
with interest in the second period of life.
The government issues additional fiat money every period. The accrued stock of
money is the only store of value in the economy and its price in terms of the commodity
adjusts to ensure the equality of demand to the accrued stock. We assume that the (gross)
growth rate of money supply, µ, is constant. Hence, M(t) −M(t − 1) = (µ− 1)M(t − 1)
for all t. The growth rate, µ, is a choice variable of the government. A fraction λ1 ≥ 0 of
newly issued money is stolen by corrupt offi cials. Out of the remaining fraction (1− λ1) of
newly issued money a share γ1 ≥ 0 is sold to the young, and shares γ2 ≥ 0 and γ3 ≥ 0 are
given to the young and the old respectively. By definition, γ1 + γ2 + γ3 = 1. The evolution
of the money supply and the distribution of newly issued money is summarized in table 3.2.
Period t
M(t) = M(t− 1) + (µ− 1)M(t− 1)
M(t− 1) carried into t from t− 1
(1− λ1)γ1(µ− 1)M(t− 1) sold to young by government
(1− λ1)γ2(µ− 1)M(t− 1) given to young by government
(1− λ1)γ3(µ− 1)M(t− 1) given to old by government
λ1(µ− 1)M(t− 1) stolen by corrupt consumers
Table 3.2. Money supply and corruption









, i = 1, 2,
where Chit (j) is the consumption at time j of an individual of type i born at time t. Type
i = 1 denotes the corrupt and type i = 2 the non-corrupt. The form of utility is the same for
both corrupt and non-corrupt individuals. We also assume that the appropriated money is
divided equally among the corrupt young, and that any gifts of money from the government
to consumers are given equally to all young and to all old.
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Under these assumptions the budget constraints of corrupt individual h1 of gen-
eration t in the two periods of life are
Ch1t (t) = ω
h1








Ch1t (t+ 1) = ω
h1
t (t+ 1) + r(t)`
h1(t) + pm(t+ 1)mh1(t)




where ωh1t (j) is the endowment received at time j, `
h1(t) is the quantity of consumption
loans granted at t, pm(t) is the price of money in units of commodity, and mh1(t) is the
quantity of money carried from t − 1 to t that is bought from old individuals and from
government. r(t) is the gross interest earned on consumption loans. By defining the net
money demand, m̄h1(t), and net money supply, m̃h1(t), where















= ωh1t (t) +
ωh1t (t+ 1)
r(t)




It is assumed that all consumption loans are repaid for sure. Hence, there is
potential for individuals to arbitrage between money and consumption loans. To prevent

























The level of saving for individual i of generation t when young is the amount that
is left after consumption and loans are granted from the endowment at time t




t (t)− `hi(t), i = 1, 2. (3.13)
Therefore, the level of saving for the corrupt individual is




























The budget constraint for the non-corrupt individual (i = 2) of generation t:
Ch2t (t) = ω
h2













Each young non-corrupt individual receives endowment ωh2t (t) and the fraction of
(1 − λ)γ2of new issued money from government at time t. `h2(t) is the loan granted and
mh2(t) is the amount of money bought from government and from old generation at time
t. Let












= ωh2t (t) +
ωh2t (t+ 1)
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An equilibrium for the economy requires aggregate saving, S(t), to be equal to the
value of money supply at time t
S(t) = pm(t)M(t). (3.20)
I assume that the intertemporal pattern of endowments is such that there exists a stationary
monetary equilibrium with S(t) = S(t+ 1). I choose to restrict attention to such equilibria
but note that there may be other non-stationary rational expectations equilibria of the
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form described by Hahn (1982) and Wallace (1980). The restriction to stationary monetary
equilibrium determines the relationship between the price of money and the quantity of
money pm(t)M(t) = pm(t + 1)M(t + 1). Since the (gross) growth rate of money supply is
constant at µ, I have M(t + 1) = µM(t) so pm(t) = µpm(t + 1). Using the no-arbitrage















ωhit (t+ 1) +
pm(t)
1 + β
[m̄hi(t)− m̃hi(t)]− `hi(t). (3.22)


















































ωhit (t + 1), and use the fact


















Solving (3.25) for S(t) gives the equilibrium level of saving as
S(t) =
βYt(t)− µYt(t+ 1)
1 + β + (1−λ1)γ2(µ−1)µ +
λ1(µ−1)
µ + (1− λ1)γ3(µ− 1)
. (3.26)
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1 + β + (1−λ1)γ2(µ−1)µ +
λ1(µ−1)
µ + (1− λ1)γ3(µ− 1)
] . (3.27)
This completes the construction of the stationary monetary equilibrium for the economy.
3.4 Seigniorage and Inflation
The analysis of equilibrium has taken the growth rate of money supply as given.
I now assume that the government chooses the rate of monetary expansion to obtain max-
imum benefit from seigniorage. In the monetary economy I have described the young
consumers purchase newly issued money by transferring units of the commodity to the gov-
ernment. Seigniorage, therefore, has a very real interpretation as units of consumption good
received by the government in exchange for money. In this sense, the government has an
incentive to maximize seigniorage.
The analysis is simplified in this section by assuming that the issue of new money
is the only source of revenue for the government. I relax this in the next section. The value




Since V 5 measures the resources received by the government this optimization describes a
leviathan model of government. That is, the government chooses the policy that maximizes
its size in terms of the flow of resources that it receives each period.
The value of seigniorage is determined by the share of the newly issued money sold
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to the young
V 5 = pm(t) [(1− λ1)γ1(µ− 1)M(t− 1)] . (3.29)
Money given to the young or old results in no resources for the government so is not included
in the measure of seigniorage. There could be other political justifications for giving money
to these groups (e.g. as pension payments to the old) but we do not explore the issue
further. Using (3.20), (3.26) and (3.29)














From (3.30) I obtain a result that links corruption to seigniorage.
Lemma 1 (i) If Yt(t)βγ3 − Yt(t+ 1) [1− γ2] > 0 an increase in corruption (λ1 increases)
raises the rate of inflation. (ii) If Yt(t)βγ3−Yt(t+ 1) [1− γ2] < 0 an increase in corruption
(λ1 increases) decreases the rate of inflation.
























(µ− 1)2 [Yt(t)βγ3 − Yt(t+ 1) [1− γ2]]
2 [Yt(t)βγ3(1− λ1)(µ− 1) + Yt(t+ 1) [(1 + β + λ1)µ+ γ2(1− λ1)(µ− 1)]]
.
It can be seen that dµdλ1 has the same sign as Yt(t)βγ3 − Yt(t + 1) [1− γ2] . Since p
m(t) =

























There is a clear intuition behind this result. The total amount of consumption
available in each period is fixed by the size of endowments. Since money has value, holding
money increases the share of this endowment a consumer can obtain relative to the share
if no money is held. The government gives some money away and some is stolen by the
corrupt. This disadvantages those who do not receive a gift of money and the non-corrupt.
Combining these observations, it can be seen that there is an incentive for those who can
buy money to do so. The government exploits this incentive to buy through seigniorage to
raise revenue.
This intuitive argument can be used to explain the role of the component terms in
the condition in Lemma 1. Money is held to transfer consumption into the second period.
The motive for doing this is strongest when Yt(t+ 1) is small relative to Yt(t). A high value
of β gives greater weight on second period consumption which enhances the incentive to
carry money into the second period. The role of γ3 in the suffi cient condition reflects the
fact that money given to the old increases the total stock of money so a young consumer
must respond by buying more money to maintain their share of future consumption. The
identity γ1 + γ2 + γ3 = 1 can be used to write
Yt(t)βγ3 − Yt(t+ 1) [1− γ2] = [Yt(t)β − Yt(t+ 1)] γ3 − Yt(t+ 1)γ1. (3.31)
Hence, it becomes more diffi cult to exploit seigniorage when the proportion of money sold
to the young is large relative to that given to the old. If all money were sold to the young
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then monetary expansion would not change the level of real resources that the young would
be prepared to sacrifice to buy money; only the value of money would change. In contrast,
giving money to the old exploits the different lifecycle positions of the young and old, and
can raise the real resources obtained from monetary expansion.
This section has demonstrated that there are circumstances in which increased
corruption in the form of the direct appropriation of newly issued money will cause a
government that is maximizing seigniorage to increase the rate of growth of money supply.
This causes the price of money in terms of commodity to fall over time which is equivalent
to an increase in the rate of inflation of the commodity price. Hence, corruption can be
positively correlated with inflation through the seigniorage activities of government.
3.5 Taxation
The basic version of the model has demonstrated that it is possible for corruption
to lead a rational government to generate inflation as it pursues supplementary revenue from
seigniorage. There are, of course, limitations with the previous analysis that we address in
this section. The two major shortcomings are the single form of corruption and the use of
a leviathan model of government. I extend the model to add additional forms of corruption
and replace the leviathan with a benevolent government that enacts policy to maximize
social welfare.
The consumers are now assumed to be endowed with a unit of time in the first
period of life. Each consumer is also endowed with a skill level that determines their wage
rate per unit of time. The time allocation is divided between leisure and labour to maximize
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utility. No labour is supplied in the second period of life. This assumption ensures that
there is a need to purchase money (or provide a consumption loan) if consumption in the
second period of life is to be positive. The government levies a tax upon labour income
at rate τ . The tax revenue that is collected, plus the revenue from seigniorage, is used to
finance a public good. The public good is enjoyed by all consumers in both periods of life.
These additions to the model open up two new channels through which corruption
can operate. The first is that corrupt consumers can collaborate with tax collectors to reduce
the effective tax rate that they pay. The second is that the corrupt can also appropriate part
of the revenue that is raised. Public good provision is then equal to the level of revenue that
remains after some has been appropriated. The government chooses the tax rate and the
growth rate of money supply to maximize social welfare taking into account the existence
of the corrupt activities.
3.5.1 Characterization of equilibrium
The utility function of a type i consumer, i = 1, 2, born at time t is now assumed

















1− ρ , (3.32)
where Lhit (t) is labour supply and G (t) the provision of public good at time t. The in-


















where ωh1t (t) is the wage rate obtained by individual h1 at time t, λ2 is the reduction
achieved in the tax rate, R (t) is the government revenue of tax and seigniorage, and λ3 is
the proportion of revenue appropriated by the corrupt. The wage rate is expressed in units
of output and reflects the (constant) marginal productivity of the individual. The budget
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The solution process of section 3.3 can be used to show that the quantity of saving
at the stationary monetary equilibrium is
S(t) =
S11 + S12 + S13λ3
R(t)
N1(t)
1 + S21 + S22
, (3.35)
where the terms Sij (and other terms used in this section) are detailed in Appendix D. The
next step is to compute the level of revenue from taxation and seigniorage. The level of















The labour supply functions and the solution for saving (3.35) can be substituted into (3.36)
and the resulting equation solved to give the level of revenue R (t) in terms of underlying
parameters. Taking the appropriation of revenue by the corrupt into account the level of
public good is
G (t) = [1− λ3]R (t) . (3.37)
The government is assumed to act benevolently in its choice of policy and pursues
the maximization of welfare despite the presence of corruption elsewhere in the economy.
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Corruption, therefore, does not extend to the choice of policy. Denoting the welfare weights
of the corrupt and the non-corrupt by µ1 and µ2 respectively, the government chooses the











The previous sub-section has characterized the stationary monetary equilibrium
of the economy. I now employ a numerical analysis to investigate the optimal choices of
tax rate and rate of growth of money supply arising from the government maximization of
welfare. The intention of the analysis is to explore the relationship between the different
forms of corruption and the rate of monetary expansion. Since the tax rate is a choice
variable, I also determine the relationship between the rate of tax and corruption.
The analysis is undertaken by making one additional simplification. I now assume
that all consumers have the same wage rate, so ωhit (t) = ω, all hi, i = 1, 2. It seems
unlikely that this assumption will significantly affect any of the conclusions. However, it
does reinforce the need to purchase money since the consumption loan channel for saving will
become less effective with identical labour incomes. Under the assumption of an identical
wage the provision level of the public good is









Table 3.3 shows how corruption in the form of the appropriation of newly issued
money supply affects the optimal choice of the tax rate and the rate of monetary expansion.
The parameter values for this analysis are reported in Appendix E. The table shows that
42
an increase in this form of corruption reduces the tax rate but raises the rate of monetary
expansion. As λ1 increases it becomes optimal to rely less on taxation to raise revenue
but instead to rely more on seigniorage even though an increased proportion of the new
monetary base is being appropriated. This can be explained by the same argument as
given earlier. More appropriation of newly-issued money leaves the young non-corrupt in a
relatively disadvantaged position so they have greater need to purchase money. This can
be exploited by the government to raise additional seigniorage revenues.
λ1
0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35
τ̂ 0.6735 0.6672 0.6627 0.6594 0.6568
µ̂ 1.0057 1.0759 1.1319 1.1776 1.2153
Table 3.3. Increased appropriation of newly issued money (λ2 = 0.50, λ3 = 0.45)
Table 3.4 shows that there is a monotonic relationship between λ2 and the effective
tax rate. As λ2 decreases (recall that a lower λ2 implies a greater reduction in the tax rate,
so lower λ2 is interpreted as more corruption) the tax rate chosen by the government falls.
Hence, this form of corruption discourages the government from using taxation as a source
of revenue. The relationship between τ̂ and λ3 is also monotonic. An increase in λ3 (more
revenue is appropriated, so there is greater corruption) implies that the tax rate rises to
offset this effect.
λ3
0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
0.4 0.62786 0.63368 0.63960 0.64517 0.65038
0.45 0.62921 0.63665 0.64420 0.65120 0.65827
λ2 0.5 0.63122 0.64075 0.65006 0.65941 0.66908
0.55 0.63428 0.64636 0.65834 0.67111 0.68375
0.6 0.63895 0.65424 0.67066 0.68748 0.70571
0.65 0.64606 0.66654 0.68900 0.71376 0.74072
Table 3.4. Effect of corruption on tax rate (λ1 = 0.3)
43
Table 3.5 shows the effect on the optimal rate of monetary expansion of changes
in corruption. The optimal rate of monetary expansion increases as λ2 decreases. This
shows that more corruption in the reduction of effective rate of tax encourages seigniorage
and increases inflation. When the effective tax rate is reduced through corruption then
seigniorage naturally becomes more significant as a source of revenues. Similarly, an increase
in λ3 - more revenue being appropriated - means that the rate of monetary expansion
increases for low λ2 but decreases for high λ2. So, an increase in either of these forms of
corruption may increase inflation but the effect of λ3 is dependent upon the interaction
between the two forms of corruption. Figure 3.1 provides a graphical representation of the
non-monotonicity with respect to λ3.
λ3
0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
0.40 1.179156 1.181890 1.184693 1.187649 1.190951
0.45 1.175311 1.177543 1.179854 1.182675 1.185573
λ2 0.50 1.171853 1.173418 1.175395 1.177608 1.179877
0.55 1.168637 1.169430 1.170735 1.172006 1.173762
0.60 1.165453 1.165370 1.165335 1.165756 1.166236
0.65 1.162064 1.160439 1.158822 1.157268 1.156021
Table 3.5. Effect of corruption on monetary expansion (λ1 = 0.3)
The final analysis investigates the effect of corruption on GDP. A similar analysis
of the effect of corruption on welfare could be undertaken but the interpretation of this
would raise questions. An increase in corruption would tend to raise the welfare of the
corrupt at the cost of the non-corrupt. It is not clear the extent to which this could be
taken as a real increase in welfare, or provide any recommendations for policy. This could
be addressed by suitable selection of the welfare weights but again there is a tension between
what the government may choose (which could be controlled more or less by the corrupt)
and what a moralistic judgement would suggest.
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Figure 3.1: Effect of tax revenue appropriation
For these reasons that focus is placed on GDP. In the economy under consideration








Figure 3.2 shows that GDP decreases when there is increased corruption through the appro-
priation of money and tax revenue. Conversely, when the corrupt are able to secure a lower
effective tax rate an increase in corruption raises GDP. The reason for this latter result is
that GDP is determined by labour supply whereas welfare is also dependent on the level
of public good. A decrease in the effective tax rate faced by the corrupt encourages more
labour supply so GDP rises. But revenue collected will fall, as will aggregate welfare. There
is also a distributional effect as more of the revenue burden is placed on the non-corrupt.
The results are given for two values of ρ, the coeffi cient of relative risk aversion, because
there are many economic models where the outcome can qualitatively change between the
cases of ρ < 1 and ρ > 1. The figures show that this is not the case in our model of
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corruption and the relationship between corruption and GDP is the same in both cases.
Figure 3.2: Corruption and GDP
The numerical results show that it is possible for an increase in corruption to
increase inflation through monetary expansion. For the parameter values considered an
increase in the appropriate of money always raises inflation. The effect is not so clear for
the appropriation of tax revenue since this interacts with corruption through reduction of
the effective tax rate.
3.6 Conclusions
There is a significant empirical correlation between corruption and inflation. In
contrast, there is no theoretical explanation of why this correlation might arise. There have
been suggestions that it can be a consequence of the government exploiting seigniorage as
an alternative means of raising revenue but there has been no demonstration that this can
be a rational policy. This chapter has provided an analysis of why a welfare-maximizing
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government faced by corruption in the economy may choose to exploit seigniorage as a
source of revenue even though this increases the rate of inflation.
I have set the analysis of corruption and inflation within an overlapping generations
economy in which money acts as a store of value. Two different versions of the model
were analyzed. In the basic model each consumer received an endowment of the single
consumption good in the first period of life which was either consumed, used to provide
consumption loans, or used to purchase money. An endowment was also received in the
second period of life and money carried over from the first period was used to purchase
additional consumption to supplement the endowment. The government chose the rate of
increase of money supply to maximize the value of seigniorage. Seigniorage was measured
as the quantity of consumption good transferred from consumers to the government. The
model had a single form of corruption which involved corrupt individuals appropriating part
of the newly produced money supply. A suffi cient condition was derived for an increase in
corruption to increase inflation.
The second model enriched the analysis by adding labour supply as a choice vari-
able, using tax revenue and the proceeds from seigniorage to finance a public good, and
introducing additional forms of corruption. The two additional forms of corruption were
the reduction of the effective labour tax rate levied on the corrupt and the appropriation of
tax revenue. This model had to be analyzed by numerical simulation which naturally limits
the extent to which we can claim generality for the results. Even so, the model was able
to demonstrate that it was possible for there to be situations in which all three types of
corruption could be positively correlated with an increase in the optimal rate of monetary
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expansion and, hence, with inflation. There were also parameter combinations for which
one, or more, forms of corruption could be negatively correlated with inflation. The analysis
also showed that an increase in the appropriation of new money or of tax revenue reduced
the level of GDP. This finding agrees with the usual perspective on the effects of corruption.
In the overlapping generations economy money acts as a store of value. It allows
consumers to carry purchasing power from early in life to later in life in order to ensure
that consumption can be smoother across the lifecycle. It is this wish to benefit from
consumption smoothing that the government exploits when it engages in seigniorage. An
increase in the money holding of one consumer, either by purchase, gift, or appropriation,
reduces the relative consumption of other consumers. The other consumers therefore have
an incentive to purchase additional money to restore their relative consumption levels. This
effect is most marked when all endowment is obtained in the first period of life so that
money has to be held to avoid zero second-period consumption. The level of seigniorage
chosen by the government is determined by the trade-off between an increased quantity of
money and a reduced consumption-price for each unit of money. The analysis shows that
corruption can shift this trade-off in the direction of increased monetary expansion and
resulting inflation.
The paper has provided a theoretical analysis that is in agreement with the em-
pirical finding of a positive correlation between inflation and corruption. We have modelled
three different forms of corruption, each of which can give the government an incentive to
exploit seigniorage to compensate for effects of corruption. This establishes very clearly that







Public sector corruption is endemic in many economies, including both developed
and developing nations, and is frequently cited as a cause of poor macroeconomic per-
formance. Corruption hinders the completion of beneficial transactions and distorts the
outcomes of economic policies. It can also affect the policy choice of governments as they
attempt to compensate for the consequences of corruption.
The previous chapter has shown that excessive inflation may be a negative side
effect of corruption if the government compensates for lost revenue by exploiting seigniorage
and increasing the rate of monetary expansion. In that analysis the major limitation was
that corruption was assumed to be exogenous. Some individuals were corrupt by nature
and did not have an option to choose to be honest. This was a good starting point for an
explanation of how corruption could be linked to inflation, but it is far from the situation
observed in reality. In practice, the choice to be corrupt is endogenously determined by
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various factors including individual characteristics and the social setting. Therefore, to
move closer toward reality, corruption needs to be explained as an endogenous outcome
that reacts to changes in the economic environment. Hindriks et al. (1999) study the
details of the interaction between a taxpayer and a tax inspector. In a neo-classical growth
model, Blackburn et al. (2010) and Blackburn and Forues-Puccio (2010) show that there
is an opportunity for public sector bureaucrats who are responsible for collecting taxes to
collude with households in bribery and tax evasion. Collusion occurs when a high-income
tax payer and a corruptible bureaucrat find it mutually advantageous to hide information
from the government. A high-income taxpayer will agree to pay a bribe when the expected
utility of paying the bribe is no less than expected utility from being compliant. Our model
differs by focusing on occupational choice and the bureaucrats decision to act corruptly. In
this chapter I build upon this research to provide a model of endogenous corruption.
The contribution of the chapter is to construct a model in which there is an option
to choose to be corrupt, and the benefits of corruption are endogenously shared between
participants in corrupt acts. The people in the model make a choice between private or
public employment on the basis of rewards that are offered and the level of work effort
expected. One of the benefits of choosing public employment is that it makes it possible to
act in a corrupt way. Corruption gives access to additional income in the form of bribes but
leads to a loss of self-esteem. Individuals are heterogenous with respect to their willingness
to undertake effort in employment and in the loss of self-esteem when acting corruptly.
These characteristics determine the set of people who choose to be corrupt. The effective
tax rate paid by firms is assumed to be determined endogenously through a generalized Nash
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bargain that determines the allocation of the benefits of corruption between tax payers and
tax offi cials. The analysis constructs the equilibrium employment allocation across the
private and public sectors, and the division between those who choose honesty and those
who are corrupt.
Section 4.2 describes the components of the model. A characterization of equilib-
rium is given in section 4.3. The equilibrium is analyzed in section 4.4 and a comparative
statics exercise is conducted. Section 4.5 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Model
The main idea of the analysis is that people working in the public sector have
the opportunity to be corrupt. They may choose to make use of this opportunity or they
may choose to be honest. Introducing this choice into the individual decision problem can
endogenize the level of corruption. To make this work there must be a heterogeneity in the
population so they do not all make the same choice.
The choice facing each person is between employment in the private sector and
employment in the government. The public sector and the private sector offer contracts
that specify the wage and the required effort level. It is assumed the government offers
a lower wage and a lower effort level. Public sector employment involves the collection of
taxes levied on firms and the provision of public goods. Within government employment
the option then arises of being corrupt. It is assumed that corruption involves levying a
lower rate of tax than required and sharing the benefit of this with the firms. The value of
government employment is then the wage plus the benefits of corruption less a loss of social
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esteem through being corrupt.
4.2.1 Employment choice
The basic idea is that people working in the public sector have the opportunity
to be corrupt. They may choose to make use of this opportunity or they may choose to
be honest. The government and the private sector offer contracts that state the wage rate
and the required level of effort. The representation of effort is based on standard models of
shirking (Bulkley and Myles 1996, Strobl and Walsh 2007). All private sector contracts are
identical. Employees in the public sector are involved with the collection of taxes and the
provision of public goods. Within government employment the option then arises of being
corrupt and it is assumed that the opportunity to be corrupt involves taking benefits from
taxation activities. Corruption gives a financial benefit from bribes received but also leads
to a loss of self esteem.
Let consumers be differentiated with respect to the valuation of the social sanction
(χ) and with respect to their disutility of effort (v). Hence, utility in the public sector when
corrupt is
U c = u1(w
g + b,G)− veg − χk, (4.1)
when honest
Uh = u2(w
g, G)− veg, (4.2)
and in the private sector
Up = u3(w
p, G)− vep, (4.3)
where wgand wp are the wages provided by public and private sector respectively. b is
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the bribe received by each corrupt person. v and χ are parameters that differ across the
population. k is the same for all people and is the social sanction on corruption. A low
value of k means a lower economy-wide sanction on corruption. The product χk is the loss
of self esteem from acting in a corrupt way.
From these payoffs it is possible to partition the space of characteristics according
to the choice of occupation and the corruption decision. Let {v, χ} ∈ Θ ≡ [0, 1]× [0, 1] . To
simplify the notation define u1 = u1(wg + b,G), u2 = u2(wg, G), and u3 = u3(wp, G). Then
the separating value of v between the private sector and honest public sector is given by




ep − eg . (4.4)
Anyone with v > v∗ will work in the public sector, and anyone with v < v∗ will work in
the private sector. The critical value of χ that separates the honest from dishonest in the
public sector is obtained from






People with χ > χ∗ will be honest, and anyone with χ < χ∗ will be corrupt. The final
division is between the corrupt in public and the private sector. The line of equality is
u3 − vep = u1 − veg − χk,
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ep − eg +
u3 − u1
ep − eg . (4.6)
The number in each occupation can then be found by integrating the areas in the set Θ.













Ng (χ, v) dvdχ,
where g (χ, v) is the distribution of characteristics in the population, and by definition
np = N − nc − nh. (4.7)
These can be reduced to the statements
nc = nc (wp, wg, b) ,
nh = nh (wp, wg, b) ,
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which show the functional dependence on the three endogenous variables wp, wg, and b.
The properties of these functions could be established by a comparative statics analysis of
the integrals.
The integrals can be written explicitly by assuming a uniform distribution for χ






















p, G)− u2(wg, G)
ep − eg )(1−
u1(w
g + b,G)− u2(wg, G)
k
). (4.8)

















p, G)− u1(wg + b,G)
ep − eg −
u1(w
g + b,G)− u2(wg, G)
2 (ep − eg)
]
. (4.9)
Given values of wp, wg, and b (4.8) and (4.9) determine the number of and honest
and corrupt public sector employees and the comparative statics are straightforward to
derive.
4.2.2 Firm’s profit
There is a representative firm with total production function f(np) where np is
employment in the private sector. The firm in a literal interpretation of the model deals
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with all of the offi cials. Some of these offi cials are corrupt, but some are not. The firm
should pay an amount τf (np) in tax, where τ is the tax rate, but it actually pays λτf (np) ,
λ ≤ 1, where λ is the proportion by which the tax is reduced due to collusion with corrupt
tax offi cials.
The profit of the firm is given by
π = [1− λτ ] f (np)− wpnp.
Note that this statement of profit adopts a normalization of the output price at 1. Then
the choice of np satisfies the necessary condition
[1− λτ ] f ′ (np)− wp = 0.
This can be written with functional dependence as
[1− λτ ] f ′
(
N − nh (wp, wg, b)− nc (wp, wg, b)
)
− wp = 0.
With Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) the equivalent statements would be
π = [1− λτ ] f ′
(




[1− λτ ] f ′ = wp.
4.2.3 Nash bargaining
There is a reduced tax rate as a result of public sector corruption endogenized in
the analysis, and that reduction in the tax rate is determined as one of the equilibrium
conditions of the model. The premise is that the share of the proceeds from corruption are
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shared between the firm and the corrupt tax offi cials using a generalization of the Nash
(1950) bargaining model (see also Harsanyi, 1977).
It might be possible to try and match firms and offi cials, so that some firms meet
honest tax offi cials and some firms meet corrupt tax offi cials. This approach would run
into significant number problems when the number of each is variable and the modelling of
matching would become a significant problem. The approach taken here is to assume that
the representative firm bargains with the collective of tax offi cials, some of whom are honest
and some corrupt. The payoffs that enter the bargain are those for the representative firm
and for the collective of tax offi cials. The two-player bargaining problem is to understand
how two sides cooperate when it leads to a Pareto-ineffi cient result if they do not bargain.
Therefore, at this point the requirement is to clarify the details of what does exactly happen
if they cooperate and if one decides not to bargain.
The component parts of the bargain are described in Table 4.1 where the value
of λ is the proportion of tax offi cials that are honest. The firm should pay τf (np) in tax
but actually pays λτf (np), so the surplus to be shared between the firm and the collective
offi cials is [1− λ] τf (np). The share of the surplus the offi cials receive is denoted s, so
the firm receives share 1 − s. The powers in the bargain over the share, s, depend on the
proportion of corrupt tax offi cials so that the more corrupt offi cials there are, then the larger
is the power of the offi cials in the bargain.
f (np) = [1− τ ] f (np) + λτf (np) + s [1− λ] τf (np) + [1− s] [1− λ] τf (np)
[1− τ ] f (np) Amount directly accruing to the firm
λτf (np) Reduced tax take going to the government
s [1− λ] τf (np) Share to corrupt tax collectors after bargaining
[1− s] [1− λ] τf (np) Share to the firm after bargaining
Table 4.1. Distribution of the firm’s total product (0 < τ < 1 , 0 < λ < 1 and 0 < s < 1)
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Therefore, the profit of the firm taking the outcome of the bargain into account is
π = [1− τ ] f (np) + [1− s] [1− λ] τf (np)− wpnp.
The payoff and the threat point for the firm, in the bargain are
Uf = [1− τ ] f (np) + [1− s] [1− λ] τf (np)− wpnp,
Uf0 = [1− τ ] f (np)− wpnp,
where Uf0 is the utility obtained if the bargain is unsuccessful. Combining these expressions
Uf − Uf0 = [1− s] [1− λ] τf (np) .
There is a potential diffi culty at this point that can be easily circumvented. If the
values of v and χ enter into the bargain the fact that these differ among the corrupt offi cials
means that there is no simple way to write the bargain. The resolution is to assume that
the social sanction is incurred even in the case that no agreement is reached in bargaining.
The interpretation of this is that the social sanction is incurred through the act of offering
to be corrupt, even if corruption does not take place.
Under this assumption the payoff of a corrupt offi cial in the event of a successful
bargain is
U c = u(wg +
s [1− λ] τf (np)
nc
, G)− veg − χk,
and the threat point is
U c0 = u(w
g, G)− veg − χk.
The difference between these is given by
U c − U c0 = u(wg +
s [1− λ] τf (np)
nc
, G)− u(wg, G).
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(U c − U c0)
ω (4.10)
= ([1− s] [1− λ] τf (np))1−ω
(
u(wg +





where ω is the power of the corrupt offi cials in the bargain. It is assumed that ω is the
share of corrupt offi cials in the public sector, so
ω =
nc (wp, wg, b)
nh (wp, wg, b) + nc (wp, wg, b)
, (4.11)
and λ is assumed to be the share of honest tax collectors who do not offer a reduced rate
of tax
λ =
nh (wp, wg, b)
nh (wp, wg, b) + nc (wp, wg, b)
. (4.12)
The solution of the bargain gives the share of s as a function of λ and ω
s = s (λ, ω) .
The values of λ and ω are, in turn, determined by the variables wp, wg and b.
4.3 Equilibrium
Employment levels (nc, nhand np) hare determined by the level of wages (wp, wg)
offered by employees as well as the endogenous level of bribe per person (b). The equilibrium
conditions that are now constructed will determine the endogenous variables of the model
(wp, wg and b).
The total payment in bribes to the corrupt offi cials is determined by the outcome
of the bargain. That is, given the share s of the surplus that the corrupt offi cials receive
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that total value of bribes is
B = s [1− λ] τf
(
N − nh (wp, wg, b)− nc (wp, wg, b)
)
.
Dividing B by the number of corrupt employees in the public sector gives the bribe per
corrupt offi cial as
b =
s [1− λ] τf
(
N − nh (wp, wg, b)− nc (wp, wg, b)
)
nc (wp, wg, b)
.
The wage in the private sector is determined from the condition for choice of labour
input be the firm. With constant returns to scale the first-order condition for the choice of
labour input is
[1− τ ] f + [1− s] [1− λ] τf = wp.
The government collects taxes to provide a public good and to pay a wage to
the public sector employees, including both the corrupt and the honest individuals. The
government budget constraint is
λτf (np (wp, wg, b)) = wg
[
nh (wp, wg, b) + nc (wp, wg, b)
]
+G.

























where the number of workers in each category are given by
nc = nc (wp, wg, b) , (4.16)
nh = nh (wp, wg, b) , (4.17)
np = N − nc − nh. (4.18)
Solving the system (4.13) - (4.15) taking account of the relations in (4.16) - (4.18) determines
the equilibrium values of wp, wg, and b.
4.3.1 Specification
To make further progress I now assume a specific distribution for the individual
characteristics and a functional form for utility. The equilibrium conditions are derived
using these assumptions and subjected to a numerical analysis in the next section.
Assume that g (χ, v) is uniform on Θ. Since Θ is the unit square it follows that
g (χ, v) = 1 for all {χ, v} ∈ Θ. The utility function is assumed to be quasi linear so that





+Gα − veg, (4.20)
and
Up = (Cp)α +Gα − vep. (4.21)
Individuals receive wages from their employer, and the corrupt offi cials also benefit
from bribes. The budget constraints for the three types of individuals are





Since all income is spent on private consumption, the indirect utility functions are, respec-
tively,
U c = (wg + b)α +Gα − veg − kχ, (4.22)
Uh = (wg)α +Gα − veg, (4.23)
and
Up = (wp)α +Gα − vep. (4.24)
Using the uniform distribution it can be calculated that
v∗ =
(wp)α − (wg)α
ep − eg , (4.25)
χ∗ =






ep − eg +
(wp)α − (wg + b)α
ep − eg .
Evaluating the integrals (4.8) and (4.9) gives
nh = N(1− (w
p)α − (wg)α
ep − eg )(1−









p)α − (wg + b)α
ep − eg −
(wg + b)α − (wg)α




np = N − nc − nh. (4.29)
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4.4 Analysis
So far the numbers of corrupt and honest offi cials as well as people working in
the private sector have been endogenized in the model in which government deals with
a firm to collect the tax to finance public goods. In addition, there is an endogenized
share of the payable tax in the form of bribe that is determined by a bargain between
the firm and corrupt offi cials. Before taking any further steps, it is necessary to check the
basic functioning of the model to show that an equilibrium can exist and to determine the
comparative statics. To see how the model behaves it is first analyzed under the assumption
that there is no corruption. Once this is completed, corruption is re-introduced.
In the economy without corruption individuals choose between the public and
private sectors based on their disutility of effort in working and the wages offered. They do
not have an opportunity or a tendency to be corrupt. Therefore, there are just two type of
individuals with the indirect utility functions (4.23) and (4.24). The critical value v∗ that
separates the two sets of individuals is determined by (4.25) where people with v > v∗ are
those who choose to work in the public sector and the remainder of population work in the















In the absence of corruption there are only two equilibrium conditions: firm max-
imization (4.30) and the government budget constraint (4.31). Without corruption, the
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government benefits from the total effective tax rate (τ) paid by the firm. Solving these
provides the equilibrium values of the exogenous variables of wg and wp and consequently
nhand np. From the profit maximization condition
wp = [1− τ ] f. (4.30)
















(4.31) can be re-written as
N
(
([1− τ ] f)α − (wg)α
ep − eg
)
(τf − wg) = G.
The left-hand side is monotonically decreasing in wg for all wg < min {[1− τ ] f, τf} , and is








Moreover, the solution occurs when ([1− τ ] f)α− (wg)α > 0, so in equilibrium wg < wp.We
assume that the effort that is needed for working in the private sector is exogenous and
higher than the required effort in the public sector (ep > eg). Therefore, when there is no
corruption (no bribe), wp has to be greater than wg otherwise no one will take the job in
the private sector. Moreover, when there is a corruption option available, the bribe raises
value of working in the public sector, and wg + b will be the payoff if corruption is chosen.
Hence, there is a need to have even stronger wp compared to wg.
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Table 4.2 shows the results of a numerical simulation of the model when there is
no corruption in the public sector. The equilibrium is calculated for different tax rates with
the parameter values for the simulation given in Appendix F. There are no corrupt public
sector offi cials so nh is the total number of public sector employees. In this baseline with no
corruption the model has the proportion of public sector workers ranging from 27 percent
(at τ = 0.2) to 56 percent (at τ = 0.5). The results show that a higher tax rate leads to a
lower wage level in the private sector due to a fall in the (net) marginal product of labour.
Therefore, the wage in public sector also decreases because of the flow of labour into the
public sector.
τ wg wp nh np rev
0.2 0.5051 0.8000 269.44 730.55 146.11
0.3 0.4690 0.7000 377.06 622.93 186.88
0.4 0.4239 0.6000 473.30 526.69 210.67
0.5 0.3712 0.5000 562.40 437.59 218.79
Table 4.2. Model without corruption
The choice to be corrupt is now re-introduced into the model. Table 4.3 summarizes
the comparative statics of the model with respect to the tax rate (τ) when there is an option
to either to be corrupt or to be honest. The values chosen are (coincidentally) around the
maximum of revenue (see Appendix G). The interesting observations from the table are
that a higher tax rate lowers the private sector wage, decreases the public sector wage, but
increases the share of the benefit of corruption that goes to corrupt tax collectors. It also
increases the proportion of the corrupt ( n
c
nc+nh
) and the size of the bribe that each corrupt
offi cial receives.
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τ b s wg wp rev nc nh n
c
nc+nh
0.1 0.1290 0.1721 0.5260 0.9152 71.92 21.750 95.970 0.1847
0.2 0.2328 0.2885 0.4985 0.8454 109.02 63.513 135.13 0.3197
0.3 0.3030 0.3590 0.4647 0.7776 131.89 105.97 156.29 0.4040
0.4 0.3530 0.41063 0.4273 0.7099 145.68 148.06 169.45 0.4663
0.5 0.3884 0.45261 0.3872 0.6415 152.55 190.36 177.75 0.5171
0.6 0.4118 0.48942 0.3449 0.5720 153.53 233.73 182.50 0.5615
0.7 0.4242 0.52360 0.3004 0.5009 149.27 279.26 184.24 0.6024
0.8 0.4255 0.55704 0.2538 0.4275 139.85 328.46 183.07 0.6421
0.9 0.4142 0.59156 0.2046 0.3508 125.10 383.74 178.63 0.6823
Table 4.3. Model with corruption
The explanation for these results is that the higher tax rate motivates the firm
to offer a higher bribe in the bargain to reduce the effective tax rate, consequently the
share going to corrupt tax offi cial (s) predictably increases. Therefore, a higher tax rate




in the Figure 4.2. The non-monotonicity of b shows that an increase in the tax
rate initially permits the bribe per person to increase as the potential revenue from taxation
rises. However, this causes further public sectors offi cials to become corrupt so the total
value of the bribe must be divided between a larger group of corrupt offi cials. This latter
effect eventually dominates, so the bribe per person then begins to fall. The wage effects
are driven by the cost of labour in the private sector operating through the equalization of
wage and marginal revenue product. The public sector wage, adjusted for the bribe, must
then keep pace with the private sector wage through labour market equilibrium.
Figure 4.3 shows how does the endogenized number of corrupt individuals working
in the public sector changes as the value of the social sanction on corruption is changed. The
figure shows that a higher level of the social sanction is associated with a lower number of
corrupt individuals in the population. This outcome is obtained through the occupational
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Figure 4.2: Tax rate, bribe and proportion of corrupt offi cials
choice decision of each individual. If the social sanction is high then corruption is less
appealing given levels of the wages and bribe. It will therefore be chosen by a smaller group
of individuals (those who place less weight on the social sanction). The results show that
this reasoning applies even after all equilibrium adjustments have been taken into account.
Consequently, if society can establish a social convention that corruption is bad, then the
level of corruption will fall.
4.5 Conclusions
There is currently a lack of theoretical examinations of public sector corruption
and its effects on economic indicators. The main objective of this chapter was to investigate
a model in which corruption emerges endogenously. Corruption is modelled as an option
that can be chosen when it is considered beneficial, and heterogeneity between people en-
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Figure 4.3: Endogenized number of corrupt individual and social sanction
sures that some may be corrupt and some honest. This is a result of individuals being
differentiated with respect to their evaluation of the loss of self-esteem that results from
acting corruptly, as well as being heterogenous in their disutility of effort.
These factors determine the choice between employment in the public (being honest
or corrupt) and employment in the private sector. Corruption leads to a loss of self-esteem
but opens up an opportunity to benefit from a bribe after bargaining with the firm. The
firm enters the bargain with corrupt tax offi cials to reduce the tax rate at the cost of the
payment of a bribe. The weight in the generalized Nash bargain determines the share of
the benefits of corruption between the corrupt and the firm.
The comparative statics of the model are determined for the cases of both corrup-
tion and the absence of corruption. The central result is that an increase in the tax rate
causes a flow in employment from the private sector to the public sector and an increase
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in the number of corrupt working in public sector. In addition, a lower level of the social
sanction on corruption leads to an increase in the number of the corrupt working in the
public sector. The results show that the level of corruption and the benefits of corruption
can be endogenized in an equilibrium model.
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Chapter 5
Endogenous Corruption in A
Dynamic Model
5.1 Introduction
Evidence has shown that there are some offi cials who choose to act corruptly in
public sector employment. It is therefore unrealistic to assume in models of economic policy
design that there is no opportunity to be corrupt, and it is far from reality to consider all
doors to corruption are quite under control and closed. Corruption seems to always be able
to find a way to penetrate, and throughout history people have always been tempted by
the potential for personal gain arising from corruption.
In the model of this chapter people choose employment in the public sector or in
the private sector taking all components of the reward offered by the work contract into
account. This includes the formal parts of the contract, such as wage levels and required
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work effort, and the non-contractual benefits that can arise from corruption. If employment
in the public sector is chosen, offi cials have to weight up the gains from abusing their
power and acting corruptly against the welfare loss that corruption incurs. It is assumed
that public sector employees are tempted by additional income in the form of bribes which
provide the incentive for them to engage in corruption. The cost is a loss in self-esteem due
to the general social sanction and objection to corruption in society. This is the process
through which corruption has been endogenized in chapter four.
The contribution of this chapter is to embed endogenized corruption within a
dynamic monetary model to analyze its interaction with inflation. The dynamic model
adopted is an overlapping generations economy (OLG) where people live for two periods,
and there is a growth in money supply with money as the only store of value. The modelling
builds on the work in chapter 3.
5.2 Dynamic Model
Assume that each consumer has one unit of labour to supply when young and none
when old. Consumers can grant (or accept) consumption loans and can purchase money.
They choose whether to work in the private or public sector, and if employment in the
public sector is chosen they have a decision on whether to be honest or corrupt.
The government issues new money in each period at (gross) rate µ. If µ > 1 then
there is monetary expansion. Assume that a share of new issued money (ϕ) is directly
stolen by corrupt offi cials before it is introduced into the economy by the government.
Shares γ1 ≥ 0, γ2 ≥ 0 and γ3 ≥ 0, γ1 + γ2+ γ3 = 1, of the remainder of the newly printed
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money are respectively sold to the young, given to the young, and given to the old by the
government. The following table summarizes the growth and distribution of money in the
economy.
Period t
M(t) = M(t− 1) + (µ− 1)M(t− 1)
M(t− 1) purchased by young from old
ϕ(µ− 1)M(t− 1) stolen by corrupt offi cial
(1− ϕ)γ1(µ− 1)M(t− 1) sold to young by government
(1− ϕ)γ2(µ− 1)M(t− 1) given to young by government
(1− ϕ)γ3(µ− 1)M(t− 1) given to old by government
Table 5.1. Money distribution
The number of consumers in each generation is N , so total population size is 2N .
Consider the payoff for the corrupt offi cials. The wage at time t is given by wg(t) and the
required effort level by eg(t). The budget constraints facing a consumer who has chosen to
be corrupt are








Cct (t+ 1) = r(t)`




Define the net monetary quantities by
m̄c(t) = mc(t)− ϕ(µ− 1)M(t− 1)
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= ωgt (t) + b (t)− pm(t)[m̄c(t)− m̃c(t)]. (5.4)
The same process for the honest offi cials and for individuals working in the private
sector can be followed. If an individual chooses to act honestly in the public sector, there is
no bribe as an additional source of revenue, so ωgt (t) is the only income. Hence, the budget
constraints for an honest individual are
Cht (t) = ω





Cht (t+ 1) = r(t)`




Define the net monetary quantities by:












= ωg(t)− pm(t)[m̄h(t)− m̃h(t)]. (5.7)
Finally, for a private sector worker the budget constraints in the two periods of
life are
Cpt (t) = ω






Cpt (t+ 1) = r(t)`




With the net monetary quantities












= ωp(t)− pm(t)[m̄p(t)− m̃p(t)]. (5.10)
The lifetime budget constraint of the three types of individual in the model are
determined by (5.4), (5.7) and (5.10). Now assume that the lifetime utility functions for
the three types of individual are respectively
U c = [Cct (t)]
α + δ [Cct (t+ 1)]









+ [G(t)]α + δ [G(t+ 1)]α − veg, (5.11)
Up = [Cpt (t)]
α
+ δ [Cpt (t+ 1)]
α
+ [G(t)]α + δ [G(t+ 1)]α − vep, (5.12)
where the superscript denotes a corrupt public sector worker (c), an honest public sector
worker (h), and a private sector worker (p).
In every case, the maximization of utility leads to the necessary condition
Cit(t+ 1) = (rδ)
1
1−α Cit(t), i = c, h, p. (5.13)




















ωj(t) + q [b (t)]− pm(t)[m̄i(t)− m̃i(t)]
]
. (5.15)
Define the indicator variable, q, where q = 1 when i = c, otherwise q = 0. Let
j = g when i = c, h and j = p when i = p. The indirect utility function can then be written
as
U i = A.
[
ωjt (t) + q [b (t)]− pm(t)[m̄i(t) + m̃i(t)]
]α
+ [G(t)]α + δ [G(t+ 1)]α − vej − q [χk] ,
(5.16)
where,






The income received by individuals in their first period of life can be consumed,
granted as a loan, or held in the form of money. The saving function is the income left after
consumption expenditure and granting of loans
Sit(t) = ω
j(t) + q [b (t)]− Cit(t)− `i(t).
By substituting the demand functions for the first period of life (5.14) with the net monetary
quantities respectively [(5.1), (5.2)] , [(5.5), (5.6)] and [(5.8), (5.9)] into the saving function,














































































The aggregate saving function is the sum of individual savings. As already noted,
money is the only outside asset. The money market is therefore in equilibrium when aggre-
gate saving is equal to the value of the money supply
S(t) = pm(t)M(t). (5.18)
In a stationary monetary equilibrium, the saving of generation t is the same as the saving
of generation t+ 1, so the amount of goods spent on purchasing money (as the only tool of
saving) at time t equals the quantity of time t+ 1 goods that are given up to buy money.
S(t) = S(t+ 1).
Hence,
pm(t)M(t) = pm(t+ 1)M(t+ 1).
Money supply creation occurs at the gross growth rate of µ
M(t+ 1) = µM(t).
This gives
pm(t) = µpm(t+ 1),
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ωg(t) + npωp(t) + nc.b
]
1 + β + (1− 1µ)[ϕ+ (1− ϕ)(γ2 + γ3)]
, (5.20)









ωg(t) + npωp(t) + nc.b
]
1 + β + (1− 1µ)[ϕ+ (1− ϕ)(γ2 + γ3)]
]
.
5.3 Seigniorage and Inflation
The next step is to clarify the measure of seigniorage in the model. By definition,
the level of government revenue obtained from seigniorage is the share of the value of newly
issued money sold to the young. Selling money transfers consumption goods from the
individuals who purchase the money to the government. Following this reasoning seigniorage
is given by
V5(t) = p
m(t) [(1− ϕ)γ1(µ− 1)M(t− 1)] . (5.21)
Since M(t− 1) = (1/µ)M(t) it follows that




The aggregate saving function (5.20) can be substituted in to replace pm(t)M(t) giving the
level of seigniorage as









ωg(t) + npωp(t) + nc.b
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To this point the analysis has been phrased in terms of pm(t), the price of money.
However, this is defined as the quantity of consumption good that has to be given up to
buy one unit of money. Consequently, the amount of money that has to be given up to
purchase one unit of consumption good is 1/pm(t). This is the price of goods at time t in
the model. Inflation occurs when there is an increase in the price of goods or a decline in









Using (5.19), the rate of inflation is determined by the net rate of money supply growth
Inf (t) = µ− 1. (5.23)
5.4 Welfare Function
In the model the government is assumed to maximize a welfare function that is a
weighted sum of the individual utilities. The weights may differ according to employment
status and engagement in corruption. ξc, ξh and ξp are respectively the welfare weights
of corrupt, honest and private employees. The government chooses the tax rate and the
growth rate of money supply to maximize the welfare function.
The welfare function can be constructed by referring back to the areas in the set
Θ described in figure 4.1 of chapter 4. The individual utility functions of the three types
can be written in the form
U c = u1(w







The critical values that separate the types are
v∗ =
u3 − u2








ep − eg +
u3 − u1
ep − eg .






















ξpUpNg (χ, v) dvdχ
]
Assume that the individual characteristics are uniformly distributed on the unit square so
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1− u1 − u2
k
]
The welfare function depends on the endogenous variables wp, wg, b and s which are deter-
mined in the equilibrium through the terms u1, u2, and u3.
5.5 Equilibrium
It now becomes possible to define and analyze the equilibrium of the model. The
representative firm in the dynamic model offers a work contract to the young individuals
in each period. This contract states the wage level wp and the required work effort ep. The
firm deals with the government tax offi cials (honest and corrupt). The condition derived
from firm’s profit maximization (5.25) specifies the wage level paid by the private sector
wp. Using this information individuals decide whether to join the firm to work or join the
government which offers a contract with wage wg and effort eg. Public sector employment




























As already discussed, there is a bargain between the firm and the corrupt offi cials
to reduce the effective tax rate from τ to λτ. λ represents the share of honest offi cials in
the public sector (4.12). Table 4.1 shows the distribution of the firm’s total product. The
benefit from the reduced tax rate is (1− λ) τ which is distributed between the firm and the
corrupt offi cials. The Nash bargaining solution determines the shares according to (4.10).
The share that goes to corrupt offi cials is distributed equally as a bribe and is determined
by (5.24). The government’s budget constraint is (5.26). The government is responsible




to public offi cials
financed by tax collected and seigniorage. The government neither borrows nor lends, so is
assumed to balance the budget in every period.
The division of the population determined by (4.7), (4.8) and (4.9) as well as
assumptions (4.11) and (4.12) are the final components of the system. This equilibrium
system can be solved for the endogenous variables.
5.6 Analysis
To start the analysis of equilibrium the full set of conditions that have been spec-
ified so far are stated. There are eight conditions in the system that jointly determine
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the endogenous variables (wp, wg, b and s) and the division of the population between
occupations.
The first three conditions are the indirect utility functions derived from consumer
optimization (5.16). The indirect utilities can be written as
U c = A
[




























+ [G(t)]α +δ [G(t+ 1)]α−vep.
These expressions have used the fact that aggregate saving is given by pm(t)M(t) from
(5.20).
The indirect utility functions enter into the determination of the endogenized em-
ployment levels nh and nc using t(4.8) and (4.9) which are the fourth and fifth equilibrium
conditions
nh= N(1−u3 − u2









1− u3 − u1
ep − eg −
u1 − u2
2 (ep − eg)
]
,
where, in the dynamic case, u1, u2 and u3 are given by
u1(w
g(t)+b(t), G(t)) = A
[









+ [G(t)]α +δ [G(t+ 1)]α ,
u2(w




















+ [G(t)]α +δ [G(t+ 1)]α .
The next three equilibrium conditions are the bribe per person (5.24), the firm
maximization condition (assuming CRS) (5.25), and the government budget constraint
(5.26). Finally, s is determined by the Nash bargain solution (4.10).
5.6.1 Equilibrium analysis
The purpose of constructing the model is to explore the link between government
actions and the level of corruption. The government controls the tax rate, the level of
public good provision, and the rate of monetary expansion. The interesting question is
how the endogenous variables - particularly the level of corruption - change as these choices
are varied. This section considers how the equilibrium depends on the key underlying
parameters by conducting numerical simulations of a range of scenarios. The next section
considers optimization of the choice variables.
Table 5.2 presents the effect of a change in the rate of tax holding public good
provision and the rate of monetary expansion constant. The basic parameter values chosen
for the simulation are given in Appendix H. Government revenue at time t, rev(t), defined
as the sum of taxes and seigniorage is increasing when the tax rate τ(t) is increased. The
use of seigniorage V5(t) as an alternative source of revenue correspondingly falls as the tax
rate increases even though the rate of monetary expansion is constant because the level
of seigniorage (5.22) depends on the endogenous variables in the model (wp, wg and b).
Moreover, in agreement with the static model of the previous chapter, when the tax rate
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increases the wage rates wg(t) and wp(t) both decrease.
τ(t) s(t) b(t) wg(t) wp(t) rev(t) V5(t)
0.1 0.5430545793 0.3090712065 0.3149361971 0.9248146303 50.56441569 10.75542257
0.15 0.5404171732 0.3193548536 0.3185091123 0.8872549678 66.54811853 9.849847076
0.2 0.5369851564 0.3225431746 0.3194690180 0.8497264196 81.26112086 9.314275179
0.25 0.5337728788 0.3228941549 0.3182361764 0.81221484822 94.40665641 8.764551544
0.3 0.5299953111 0.3210323599 0.3152998259 0.7747300844 106.2217964 8.250570855
0.35 0.5253269841 0.3173321017 0.3109704911 0.7372754904 116.8597961 7.813939139
0.4 0.5200500248 0.3122874544 0.3053871738 0.6998391986 126.2641516 7.372989672
0.45 0.5140297826 0.3060087533 0.2986897694 0.6624114243 134.4902386 6.949537076
0.5 0.5072431098 0.2986106977 0.2909581736 0.6249737687 141.5362395 6.540450402
Table 5.2. Effects of a tax increase
The relationship between the tax rate and the level of the bribe is more interesting.
Table 5.2 illustrates that there is a non-monotonic relationship with the bribe per person
reaching a maximum at a tax rate of τ = 0.25 and then decreasing as the tax rate increases
further. This relationship is shown in more detail in figure 5.1. An increase in the tax
rate increases the potential gain to the firm and the offi cials from engaging in corruption.
The non-monotonic relationship is explained by the fact the b is the bribe received by each
corrupt offi cial. As the tax rate increase the number of corrupt as the tax rates increases,
and wages decrease. This makes a given size of bribe relatively more attractive.
Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of the three types of individuals for different
tax rates. It can be seen that employment in the public sector increases when the tax
rate increases, and consequently the number of individuals working in the private sector
is reduced. This can be explained by the decreasing wage offered by the firm (table 5.2)
that makes public sector employment relatively more attractive. Moreover, the number
of corrupt offi cials also increases as the tax rate increases, and increases even faster as a
proportion of workers in the private sector. The first effect is due to some of the workers
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Figure 5.1: Bribe and the tax rate
transferring from the private sector to the public sector being willing to engage in corruption,
while the second effect is a consequence of the falling denominator in the expression for the
proportion.
Further insight into how the division of the population between types is affected by
the tax rate is given in figure 5.3. The proportion of corrupt in the population is increasing
as the tax rate increases. This is not surprising since the private wage is falling and there
is a greater surplus to be shared as bribes. What seems surprising is that the proportion of
public sector workers that are corrupt falls as the tax rate increases. This is explained by
the influx of former private sector workers into the public sector as the tax rate increases,
who were formerly in the private sector partially because of their reluctance to engage in
corruption.
It has been assumed that the social sanction on corruption is a determinant of each
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Figure 5.2: Distribution of population
Figure 5.3: Proportion of corrupt offi cials
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Figure 5.4: Social sanction and corruption
consumer’s behaviour. The consumers who work in the public sector choose to be corrupt
based on their attitude towards the social sanction level and how the sanction affects their
self-esteem (equation 4.1). The simulated effect of increasing the social sanction upon the
proportion of public employers that are corrupt is displayed in Figure 5.4. The figure
demonstrates that an economy with a higher social sanction on corruption will experience
a lower level of corruption. This is the case when the level of social sanction is exogenously
determined.
As the government controls the tax rate, the level of public good provision, and
the rate of monetary expansion, the next step is to analyze how the endogenous variables
change if the rate of money expansion is changed by the government (given the tax rate and
the level of public good remain constant). Table 5.3 shows that a higher rate of monetary
expansion is associated with a higher number of corrupt offi cials working in the public sector
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but a lower bribe per person and a lower share goes to corrupt offi cials in the bargain. The
level of seigniorage and government revenue are higher when µ increases.
µ(t) s(t) b(t) wg(t) wp(t) rev(t) V5(t) n
c nh
1.1 0.5562 0.3371 0.3162 0.849366 75.90 5.658 115.92 92.46
1.2 0.5358 0.3216 0.3196 0.849743 81.58 9.537 120.00 103.9
1.3 0.5251 0.3140 0.3208 0.849873 84.50 11.58 121.9 110.2
1.4 0.5168 0.3083 0.3213 0.849943 86.67 13.09 123.3 115.2
1.5 0.5108 0.3046 0.3213 0.849976 88.11 14.06 124.1 118.9
1.6 0.5063 0.3021 0.3210 0.849991 89.07 14.65 124.7 121.5
1.7 0.5028 0.3004 0.3205 0.849998 89.69 14.99 125.0 123.5
1.8 0.5002 0.2993 0.3199 0.849999 90.09 15.15 125.2 125.1
1.9 0.4980 0.2986 0.3193 0.849999 90.32 15.18 125.29 126.2
2 0.4963 0.2982 0.3186 0.849997 90.42 15.13 125.3 127.1
Table 5.3. Effects of a monetary expansion
As already noted the assumption is that the value of omega (the power of bar-




Moreover, the simulation has been regenerated to see how the results change if there is a
constant power of bargaining (ω = 0.5). This captures a Nash bargain in which the relative
power of the two parties is not affected by the level of corruption. It acts as a baseline
case from which to judge the later results. The tables and figures in Appendix I show that
there are no significant changes in the results compared to the case of variable omega. The
interesting point is that when the relative power of the two parties is affected by corruption,
the level of corruption is higher than for the case with constant bargaining power (in terms
of the the level of the bribe, the number of corrupt offi cials).
Figure 5.5 shows the effect of monetary expansion on the wage rates in the private
and public sectors. When there is a higher rate of monetary expansion (the government
sells more money to the population as a source of revenue), the wage rate in both public
and private sector initially increase. The explanation could be a flow to the public sector
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Figure 5.5: Effect of monetary expansion on wages
when the public revenue increases. However, there is a point for both at which the wage
rates wg(t) and wp(t) begin to decrease with further monetary expansion.
5.6.2 Welfare effects
I now consider how social welfare depends on the tax rate and the rate of monetary
expansion. These welfare results lead into the analysis of optimal policy.
Table 5.4 displays how social welfare changes as the rate of monetary growth in-
creases. The idea is that a welfare-maximizing government will have an incentive to rely
on seigniorage to compensate for the reduction in tax revenue that results from corrup-
tion. However, seigniorage causes inflation which affects the intertemporal distribution of
resources. The table assumes a tax rate of 20% (τ = 0.2) and the value of the social sanction
on corruption is assumed to be 1/2 (k = 0.5). The values of other parameters used in this
simulation are the same as given in Appendix G.
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Figure 5.6: Monetary expansion and the number of corrupt offi cials
µ(t) 1.3 1.31 1.32 1.33 1.34 1.35 1.36 1.37 1.38 1.39
W (t) 375.33 375.40 375.45 375.49 375.52 375.53 375.54 375.53 375.51 375.49
nc 121.94 122.11 122.27 122.42 122.56 122.70 122.83 122.96 123.08 123.20
nc
nc+nh
0.5251 0.5241 0.5232 0.5223 0.5214 0.5206 0.5198 0.5190 0.5182 0.5175
Table 5.4. Welfare function and the growth rate of money supply
Figure 5.6 show that higher monetary expansion raises the number of corrupt
individuals and their share in the public sector. (while the rate of tax, public goods and
the level of social sanction on corruption are constant)
The maximum level of the welfare (375.54) is achieved when money supply growth
is at the net rate of 36%.The key observation is that there is an optimum rate of monetary
expansion and hence a limit of the beneficial amount of seigniorage. Equation (5.23) indi-
cated that in fact the inflation rate equals the net rate of money supply growth. Therefore,
at this rate of monetary expansion the inflation rate is also 36%. The number of corrupt
offi cial is 122 individuals out of 1000 of population and their share in the public sector is
51%. This is optimum numbers for the case when government chooses 36% of monetary
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expansion, 20% for the tax rate, and when there is a given social sanction at 0.5. To see
whether the welfare function shows the same behavior (with a maximum level) the simu-
lation was repeated for different values of k and τ , and table 5.5 reports the values of the
optimal growth rate of money supply (µ) as τand k are varied. The graphs of the welfare
functions are nicely concave with a clear optimum point in each case (see an example plot
in Appendix J).
It has already been noted that an economy with a lower social sanction experi-
ences higher corruption in the public sector. Moreover, the table shows that when the
social sanction increases, the optimal value of monetary expansion, µ̂, that is chosen by
the government declines. Therefore, a higher level of corruption is associated with the gov-
ernment choosing a higher growth rate of money supply. The mechanism underlying this
result is that corruption causes some potential tax revenues to be translated into bribes.
The government reacts to this loss of revenue by turning to the alternative revenue source
of seigniorage. In turn, greater seigniorage causes the value of money to fall and inflation
to rise. This is one of the central conclusions from the analysis: for any given tax rate,
increased corruption and higher monetary expansion will occur together in equilibrium.
k=0.5 k=0.6 k=0.7 k=0.8 k=0.9 k=1.0 k=2.0
τ µ̂ Ŵ µ̂ Ŵ µ̂ Ŵ µ̂ Ŵ µ̂ Ŵ µ̂ Ŵ µ̂ Ŵ
0.1 1.47 394.9 1.37 426.1 1.30 447.5 1.221 462.8 1.229 473.9 1.2199 482.4 1.12 522.7
0.15 1.41 383.5 1.32 409.5 1.27 428.6 1.230 442.9 1.200 454.1 1.18 463.2 1.018 508.7
0.2 1.36 375.5 1.29 397.7 1.24 415.3 1.200 429.1 1.160 440.2 1.13 449.4 1.000000010 495.3
0.25 1.32 369.8 1.26 388.9 1.21 405.0 1.160 418.2 1.121 428.9 1.1 437.9 1.000000005 481.8
0.3 1.28 365.6 1.22 382.0 1.17 396.7 1.130 409.0 1.100 419.2 1.10000006 427.7 1.000000008 468.3
Table 5.5. Optimum rate of money supply and social sanction on corruption
The optimal growth rate of the money supply, µ̂, declines as the social sanctions
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on corruption increases (and the proportion of corrupt public sector offi cials also declines)
no matter what the tax rate is. This is shown in figure 5.7. Hence, seigniorage (5.21)
and inflation (5.23) are lower in a society with less corruption, what is important is that
there is no causality of one variable on the other. Both are endogenous and are determined
simultaneously in equilibrium.
Figure 5.7: Optimal growth rate of money supply and social sanction on corruption
The parameter ϕ captures the direct appropriation of the newly issued money by
corrupt offi cials. The parameter describing the degree of appropriation is assumed to be
exogenous in this model where corrupt offi cials have been endogenized. Table 5.6 shows
that when a greater proportion of the new money supply is stolen the optimal growth
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rate of money approaches zero, and the level of welfare is decreasing with higher ϕ. This
is a consequence of seigniorage becoming less effective as a source of revenue when more
money is stolen, so the incentive for the government to inflate the money supply to exploit
seigniorage is reduced.
ϕ = 0.1 ϕ = 0.15 ϕ = 0.2 ϕ = 0.25 ϕ = 0.3
µ̂ Ŵ µ̂ Ŵ µ̂ Ŵ µ̂ Ŵ µ̂ Ŵ
1.36 375.54 1.3 368.91 1.24 362.64 1.12 357.20 1.00001 355.67
Table 5.6. Exogenous appropriation of newly issued money and the monetary expansion
In addition, the optimal tax rate (τ̂) that maximizes social welfare is also affected
by the value of the social sanction. Table 5.6 shows that τ̂ increases with a higher social
sanctions until the point k = 0.8, and then declines after this point (µ is assumed to be
1.1 in this table). However, the maximum welfare level is still higher in an economy with a
higher social sanction (even with lower τ̂). When the social sanction is higher we saw that
government chooses lower seigniorage (figure 5.7) but uses a higher tax rate as a source
of revenue (table 5.7) where at some point of social sanction upwards (k = 0.8 in this
simulation) the optimal tax rate levied is lower. This means that lower seigniorage and
lower tax rate are associated with higher level of social sanction on corruption.
k = 0.5 k = 0.6 k = 0.7 k = 0.8 k = 0.9 k = 1.0 k = 2.0
τ̂ Ŵ τ̂ Ŵ τ̂ Ŵ τ̂ Ŵ τ̂ Ŵ τ̂ Ŵ τ̂ Ŵ
0.12 372.9 0.12073 404.9 0.1362 425.4 0.1409 440.8 0.1406 453.5 0.1379 464.3 0.0985 522.7
Table 5.7. Optimal tax rate in different social sanctions
The table 5.8 as well as figure 5.8 show that the optimal tax rate tends to zero
when the government relies on more monetary expansion. This result shows that for the
parameter values used, it is better to use seigniorage to finance the public good. This is
because tax revenue is subject to corruption which limits its effectiveness. The graphs of
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the welfare functions are nicely concave with a clear optimum point in each case (see an
example plot in Appendix K).
µ = 1.1 µ = 1.15 µ = 1.2 µ = 1.25 µ = 1.3 µ = 1.35 µ = 1.4
τ̂ Ŵ τ̂ Ŵ τ̂ Ŵ τ̂ Ŵ τ̂ Ŵ τ̂ Ŵ τ̂ Ŵ
1.12 372.98 0.08 382.35 0.06 391.79 0.03 401.34 0.02 411.044 0.004 420.71 0.000000001 429.58
Table 5.8. Optimal tax rate and growth rate of money supply
Figure 5.8: Optimal tax rate and monetary expansion
5.7 Conclusion
This chapter completes the model of endogenous corruption presented for the static
case in the previous chapter. The main objective was to develop the model in a dynamic
monetary framework in which there is a growth in money supply and to investigate the
equilibrium relationship between corruption and inflation. This was intended to answer
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the main question of the thesis which was to find how seigniorage reacts to endogenized
corruption. Hence, the equilibrium conditions embedded in an overlapping generations
model were used to obtain numerical results. These conditions include optimal consumption
of the three types of individuals, firm maximization, government budget constraint, F.O.C
of the Nash bargaining solution, the number of corrupt and honest individual and people
who work in the private sector. The simulation results of the model are briefly listed below.
First, the numerical results demonstrate the positive economics of the equilibrium.
The higher corporation tax rate leads to a lower wage level in the private sector wp(t) and
in the public sector wg(t). The decline in wg(t) could be explained by an increase in labour
supply in public sector due to a decline in wp(t). A higher tax rate also causes an increase in
the number of corrupt individuals. However, their share in the public sector population is
lower when the tax rate is higher. When the economy faces a higher level of social sanction
on corruption (k), the number of corrupt offi cials in the public sector is lower. This confirms
the first assumption that considers the social sanction as a disincentive of the self-esteem
in the utility function of corrupt offi cials.
The second part of the results is summarized as follows. There is an optimal growth
rate of money supply and an optimal tax rate (τ̂) that are chosen by welfare-maximizing
government. The government chooses a higher optimal tax rate (τ̂) when there is a higher
social sanction on corruption, but this increase reaches a maximum point and declines
afterwards. This implies that there is an optimum social sanction in which government could
impose higher tax rate (when µ is chosen around the optimum). Moreover, lower monetary
expansion leads to a sharp increase in optimal tax rate (τ̂) when the social sanction (k) is
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assumed to be given. This is predictable as monetary expansion is an alternative source of
revenue rather than taxes in a same level of social sanction (k).
The final part of the results indicates that the growth rate of money supply (µ̂)
that is chosen by government is higher when there is a lower social sanction on corruption
(k), and as the lower social sanction causes a higher proportion of corrupt individual in the
public sector there is a conclusion that the higher optimal inflation rate (µ̂) is associated
with lower k and so greater corruption in the public sector. This is the outcome that the




Corruption as an economic issue has been cited as a cause of poor economic per-
formance. The negative impact of corruption on economic growth has been explored em-
pirically and theoretically by many scholars. Susan Rose-Ackerman (1999) states that cor-
ruption is a condition in which people (politicians, public offi cials, and businesses) use their
privileged positions in order to pursue economic gain. She considers corruption as a reason
for low rates of economic growth in countries with well-educated labour and rich natural
resources. In contrast, there are some studies suggesting that corruption might be beneficial
in economies with poor-functioning institutions. The idea is that ineffi cient bureaucracies
hinder investment, and corruption acts as "grease" to help circumvent these ineffi ciencies.
The idea of corruption greasing the wheels is explored by Huntington (1968), Leys (1965),
Beck and Maher (1986) and Lien (1986) although this idea is not consistent with literature
of the empirical and theoretical evidence on the negative effect of corruption on growth
and investment which is called the "sand the wheels" hypothesis (Méon and Sekkat (2005),
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Kurer (1993), and Shleifer and Vishny (1993)).
The analysis of the impact of corruption on inflation has become a topic of interest
since 2000. The empirical study by Al-Marhubi (2000) showed that corruption could be
an explanation for inflation while Braun and Di Tella (2000) explained that inflation is an
incentive for corruption. There have been suggestions that corruption can increase infla-
tion because of the government exploiting seigniorage to compensate for the lost revenue.
However, there has been no demonstration that this can be a rational policy. The main
objective of this study was to provide an analysis in which higher corruption is associated
higher inflation rate as a result of rational behavior of the public offi cials and individuals.
The general definition of inflation is a sustained increase in the general price level.
Monetarists are agreed that the main reason behind increasing prices is growth in money
supply. Consequently, inflation is a monetary phenomenon in the long-run. In this study
the idea has been explored that corruption could cause the rate of monetary expansion to
be higher and, hence, increase the inflation rate.
The study started with an empirical exploration of the link between corruption
and inflation. A panel data analysis has been undertaken by using a dataset covering 164
countries with stationary variables from 1995 to 2010. By considering the whole sample, the
coeffi cient on corruption is significant and indicates a positive link between corruption and
inflation. The model has also been tested with two divisions in the data sample. In the first
division the coeffi cient for corruption is slightly lower for OECD countries in comparison
to non-OECD countries, and in both cases the coeffi cient is statistically significant. This
result shows that in developed countries the impact of corruption on inflation is lower than
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its impact in developing countries. In the second division the coeffi cient of corruption is
statistically significant for non oil-exporting countries, but it is insignificant for oil-exporting
economies.
These results show that corruption is positively associated with inflation in each
data sample, and they confirm previous findings in the literature. This finding was taken
as a motivation to undertake the theoretical study at the very early stage of the research.
The main body of the work started with chapter three in which the analysis of
corruption and inflation has been set within two versions of an overlapping generations
model in which money was the only store of value, and seigniorage was introduced as the
quantity of consumption good transferred from consumers to the government. In the basic
version of the model where the government chose the rate of money supply growth to
maximize the level of seigniorage, a single type of corruption was examined in the form
of direct appropriation of newly issued money. A suffi cient condition was derived for an
increase in corruption to increase inflation.
In the second version of analysis model has been developed by adding labor supply
as a choice variable. A tax rate upon labor income levied by government as well as the
revenue raised from seigniorage financed the provision of public goods in the public sector.
These additional elements provided the model to explore for two other types of corruption.
In the first type taxpayers were able to collaborate with tax collectors to decrease the
effective tax rate, and the second type was in a form of an appropriation of a share of public
revenue. Each of three forms of corruption was an incentive for the public sector to exploit
seigniorage. A welfare-maximizing government chose the tax rate and the growth rate of
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money supply by taking into account the existence of the corrupt activities.
The numerical analysis of the simulation restricted the demonstration to claim
generality for the results. Nevertheless, the model was able to illustrate that all three
exogenous types of corruption could be positively associated with an increase in the optimal
rate of money supply growth and, therefore, with the inflation rate. The results also showed
that higher appropriation of newly-issued money or of the tax revenue was correlated with
lower levels of GDP. This was in agreement with the literature of corruption sanding the
wheels of economic growth. This establishes very clearly that excessive inflation can be the
consequence of a rational policy response to the existence of corruption.
This was a motivational starting point of the research. To step further into the
theoretical analysis of corruption and inflation, the assumption of endogenous corruption
was introduced in chapter four which was closer to the situation observed in reality. In
practice, choosing to act corruptly is an option that is determined by various individual
characteristics and the social setting. In the endogenous model corruption was an option
chosen when it is considered beneficial, and there was heterogeneity between individuals to
ensure that some may be honest and some corrupt. Individuals were heterogeneous in their
evaluation of the disutility of effort and the loss of self-esteem resulted from acting corruptly.
These factors endogenized corruption and determined the choice between employment in the
public sector (being honest or corrupt) and employment in the private sector. If corruption
is chosen, it leads to a loss in self-esteem but opens up an opportunity to benefit from a
bargain with a firm. It is assumed that there is a bargaining game between tax offi cials
and the firm to reduce the effective tax rate at the cost of the payment of a bribe. The
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endogenous share that is exchanged between the players was determined by a generalized
Nash bargain.
The comparative statics of the model were determined for the cases of both cor-
ruption and the absence of corruption. In both analyses the results showed that there was a
flow of employment from the private sector to the public sector when there was an increase
in the tax rate. Moreover, a lower level of social sanction on corruption caused an increase
in the population of corrupt offi cials working in the public sector. These central results
demonstrated that it is possible to endogenize corruption and benefits from corruption in
an equilibrium.
To explore the impact of endogenized corruption and inflation, the static model
developed in chapter four has been embedded in a monetary dynamic model in chapter
five. In an overlapping generations model (OLG) individuals lived for two periods of life,
and there was a growth in money supply as the only store of value. It was assumed that
each individual worked in the first period of life and chose to work either in public sector
or in private sector by taking into account the components introduced in the static model.
A welfare-maximizing government chose the rate of corporation tax as well as the rate of
money supply growth, and it provided public goods financed by revenue raised from tax
and seigniorage. Because of the complicated nine equilibrium conditions, the model had to
be analyzed by numerical simulations. Results showed that higher social sanction causes
smaller corrupt public sector. The main finding of the analysis was where the higher social
sanction (lower corruption) was associated with the lower optimal rate of money supply,
and then with inflation.
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Although the theoretical analysis of exogenous and endogenous corruption and
inflation ends here in a form of a PhD thesis, it opens up some further research paths that
are summarized below:
• Corruption could be endogenized in not only social settings but also individ-
ual characteristics. How could the heterogeneity in individual characteristics such as age
and occupations influence decision makers to choose between corruption and honesty? How
does this affect inflation?
• A comparison between social and individual effects on corruption and infla-
tion could be another interesting point to analyze.
• In this study, corruption was analyzed as a reason for the lost public revenue
and therefore for the budget deficit. However, the next point that could enrich the analysis
of corruption and inflation is to explore corruption as a cause of excess public expenditure
that could also results in budget deficit and exploiting seigniorage!




Appendix A - List of resources measuring CPI used by International Trans-
parency
1 African Development Bank Governance Ratings 2012
2 Bertelsmann Foundation Sustainable Governance Indicators 2014
3 Bertelsmann Foundation Transformation Index 2014
4 Economist Intelligence Unit Country Risk Ratings
5 Freedom House Nations in Transit 2013
6 Global Insight Country Risk Ratings
7 IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 2013
8 Political and Economic Risk Consultancy Asian Intelligence 2013
9 Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide
10 Transparency International Bribe Payers Survey 2011
11 World Bank - Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 2012
12 World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey (EOS) 2013
13 World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2013
Appendix B - List of countries classified by codes
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Albania Alb Dominican Republic Dor
Algeria Alg Egypt Egy
Argentina Arg El Salvador Els
Armenia Arm Estonia Est
Australia Aus Finland Fin
Azerbaijan Aze Gabon Gab
Bahamas Bhm Gambia Gam
Bangladesh Ban Ghana Gha
Belarus Bls Guatemala Gut
Bolivia Bol Haiti Hai
Botswana Bts Honduras Hnd
Brazil Bra Hong Kong Hng
Bulgaria Blg Hungary Hun
Cameroon Cam Iceland Ice
China Chn India Ind
Colombia Col Indonesia Ins
Costa Rica Cos Ireland Ire
Cote d’Ivoire Cot Israel Isr
Croatia Cro Japan Jap
Cyprus Cyp Jordan Jor
Czech Republic Czr Kazakhstan Kaz
Denmark Den Kenya Ken
Latvia Lat Senegal Sen
Lithuania Lit Singapore Sin
Malaysia Mal Slovenia Slo
Malta Mlt South Africa Soa
Mexico Mex Sri Lanka Sri
Moldova Mol Sudan Sud
Mongolia Mon Sweden Swe
Morocco Mor Switzerland Swi
Mozambique Moz Syria Syr
New Zealand New Tanzania Tan
Nigeria Nig Thailand Tha
Pakistan Pak Tunisia Tun
Panama Pan Turkey Tur
Papua New Guinea Pap Uganda Uga
Paraguay Par United Kingdom Gbr
Peru Per United States Usa
Philippines Phi Uruguay Uru
Poland Pol Venezuela Ven
Romania Rom Vietnam Vie
Russia Rus Yemen Yem
Saudi Arabia Sau Zambia Zam
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Appendix 1.3 - List of oil-exporting county codes
Alg Ang Ecu Irn Irq Kwt Lib Nig Qat Sau Uae Ven Aze Col Con Equ Gab
Ins Kaz Mex Nor Omn Rus Sud Syr Tri Cub Chn Tha Cot Tur Yem Bra
Bru Vie Bah Chd Tim Egy Tun Cam New Pap Alb Cnd Phi Gre Per Ger
Gut Est Sur Mrt Ita Mon Blz Pol
Appendix C - List of OECD country codes
Aus Aut Bel Can Chl Czr Den Est Fin Fra Ger Gre Hun Ice Ire Isr Ita Jap
Kor Lux Mex Net New Nor Pol Por Slr Slo Spa Swe Swi Tur Gbr Usa

































































































































































































1 µ2 ρ β γ1 γ2 γ3 w λ1 λ2 λ3
10 10 1 1 0.9 0.4 0.7 0.1 0.2 1 0.3 0.45 0.5
Appendix F - The baseline values of the parameters for the simulation in the
endogenous static model
α f N ep eg δ µ k G
0.2 1 1000 1 0.5 0.5 1.2 0.5 10
Appendix G -The baseline values of the parameters for the simulation in the
endogenous static model
α f N ep eg δ τ k G
0.2 1 1000 1 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.5 10
Appendix H -The baseline values of the parameters for the simulation in the
endogenous dynamic model
α f N ep eg δ µ k G
0.2 1 1000 1 0.5 0.5 1.2 0.5 10
Appendix I - Results for when there is constant ω (CO) in the model (ω = 0.5)





Bribe per person and the tax rate
Distribution of population
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Proportion of corrupt offi cials
Social sanction and corruption (with constant ω (CO))
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µ s b wg wP rev V 5 nc nh
1.1 0.5 0.321566 0.321922 0.853207 79.13579 5.647582 114.2661 100.4933
1.2 0.5 0.312612 0.322955 0.852187 83.19777 9.245348 118.2817 108.3681
1.3 0.5 0.307202 0.323141 0.851501 85.81507 11.57534 120.8322 113.7867
1.4 0.5 0.303831 0.322855 0.851015 87.53095 13.08754 122.508 117.6333
1.5 0.5 0.301719 0.322301 0.850657 88.6578 14.05578 123.6281 120.4226
1.6 0.5 0.300425 0.321595 0.850386 89.38716 14.65373 124.3796 122.4749
1.7 0.5 0.299678 0.320808 0.850177 89.84191 14.99517 124.8787 123.9991
1.8 0.5 0.299307 0.319982 0.850013 90.1036 15.15662 125.2009 125.1365
1.9 0.5 0.299199 0.319146 0.849883 90.22782 15.1907 125.3968 125.9856
2.0 0.5 0.299276 0.318317 0.849779 90.2533 15.13421 125.5012 126.6167
Effects of a monetary expansion (when ω is constant 0.5) while Table 5.3 is for ω variable
Appendix J. The plot of the simulated welfare function (k = 0.7 and
τ = 0.15)
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